A/65/201 ideas and actions, and solicit funding, but could eventually adopt the use of ICTs for attack. 7. There is increased reporting that States are developing ICTs as instruments of warfare and intelligence, and for political purposes. Uncertainty regarding attribution and the absence of common understanding regarding acceptable State behaviour may create the risk of instability and misperception. 8. Of increasing concern are individuals, groups or organizations, including criminal organizations, that engage as proxies in disruptive online activities on behalf of others. Such proxies, whether motivated by financial gain or other reasons, can offer an array of malicious services to State and non-State actors. 9. The growing use of ICTs in critical infrastructures creates new vulnerabilities and opportunities for disruption, as does the growing use of mobile communications devices and web-run services. 10. States are also concerned that the ICT supply chain could be influenced or subverted in ways that would affect the normal, secure and reliable use of ICTs. The inclusion of malicious hidden functions in ICTs can undermine confidence in products and services, erode trust in commerce and affect national security. 11. The varying degrees of ICT capacity and security among different States increases the vulnerability of the global network. Differences in national laws and practices may create challenges to achieving a secure and resilient digital environment. III. Cooperative measures 12. The risks associated with globally interconnected networks require concerted responses. Member States over the past decade have repeatedly affirmed the need for international cooperation against threats in the sphere of ICT security in order to combat the criminal misuse of information technology, to create a global culture of cybersecurity and to promote other essential measures that can reduce risk. 13. Over the past decade, efforts to combat the threat of cybercrime have been conducted internationally, in particular, within the Shanghai Cooperation Organization, the Organization of American States, the Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation Forum, the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) Regional Forum, the Economic Community of West African States, the African Union, the European Union, the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe and the Council of Europe, as well as through bilateral efforts between States. 14. Non-criminal areas of transnational concern should receive appropriate attention. These include the risk of misperception resulting from a lack of shared understanding regarding international norms pertaining to State use of ICTs, which could affect crisis management in the event of major incidents. This argues for the elaboration of measures designed to enhance cooperation where possible. Such measures could also be designed to share best practices, manage incidents, build confidence, reduce risk and enhance transparency and stability. 15. As disruptive activities using information and communications technologies grow more complex and dangerous, it is obvious that no State is able to address these threats alone. Confronting the challenges of the twenty-first century depends 10-46957 7