NATIONAL MARITIME CYBERSECURITY PLAN information and networks, and detect when malign actors are attempting to access protected systems. Other areas in which cybersecurity affects MTS security and resilience are PNT and satellite communications. Cargo ships around the world drive the global supply chain, all of which rely on PNT services for navigation, offloading cargo, and the operation of on-board cyber systems. For example, the compromise of a vessel’s PNT receiver could degrade the ability to navigate safely at sea or within a densely populated waterway, potentially leading to a transportation security incident or maritime accident. To help address these risks within the maritime domain, this Plan advances the responsible use of PNT service per E.O. 13905. 23 Technologies such as Radio Frequency Identification (RFID) and monitoring are effective in locating and identifying cargo; however, these technologies expose the cargo tracking systems to exploitation. DHS, in 2016, predicted that the denial or loss of cargo information could bring port operations to a complete halt if backup was unavailable for cargo information that enables identifying and locating containers, thereby significantly hampering the receipt and distribution of cargo. 24 Strategic Sealift and Ports: National Defense Considerations Cyberspace is a warfighting domain in which capable adversaries continually attempt to degrade our Nation’s ability to project United States military forces globally. As such, United States Transportation Command (USTRANSCOM) designated “improving mission assurance within the cyber domain” as a top priority. 25 USTRANSCOM is responsible for military power projection, including sealift. Amassing military power projection requires the maritime capability to move large weapons systems and equipment, such as tanks or artillery, as opposed to airlift that may only carry one tank due to size and weight constraints. Moreover, United States Cyber Command has responsibility for protecting Department of Defense information networks, including information networks operating on United States Navy vessels and USTRANSCOM-regulated or operated ships. In a large-scale military mobilization, the United States’ fleet of government-owned surge sealift vessels would provide the majority of strategic sealift capacity. These vessels, maintained around the country in reduced operating status, can be fully crewed and ready for mission assignment within five days of activation. Maintenance of the surge sealift fleet occurs through two separate programs: Military Sealift Command (MSC)’s surge sealift fleet and the Maritime Administration’s Ready Reserve Force (RRF). During an initial mobilization surge, additional deployment and sustaining cargo would be carried by United States-flagged commercial vessels in accordance with the United States Government’s 23 The White House, Executive Order on Strengthening National Resilience through Responsible Use of Positioning, Navigation, and Timing Services, 2020, https://www.whitehouse.gov/presidential-actions/executive-order-strengtheningnational-resilience-responsible-use-positioning-navigation-timing-services/ 24 United States Department of Homeland Security, Consequences to Seaport Operations From Malicious Cyber Activity, 2016, pp10 25 United States Transportation Command, Statement of General Stephen Lyons, Commander, United States Transportation Command, Before the Senate Armed Services Committee, February 25, 2020. A-6