NATIONAL MARITIME CYBERSECURITY PLAN ANNEX B OVERVIEW OF THE OPERATIONAL ENVIRONMENT The Federal government and private industry depend heavily on MTS industries, vessels, infrastructure, logistics networks, and personnel during times of peace, war, and national emergency. Privately owned United States-flagged ships in the inland, coastal, and international trades, United States government-owned military and auxiliary vessels, seafarers, and domestic shipyards and port facilities that support and sustain the maintenance and operations of United States vessels are critical national security resources. 17 United States ships that regularly call foreign ports routinely exchange data with foreign port authorities, port stakeholders, and other port services, including military facilities, over foreign owned and operated networks. Cyberspace Implications to the MTS Maritime cyberspace is a global domain consisting of users on interdependent networks of IT infrastructure, OT infrastructure, resident data, the electromagnetic spectrum, and any telecommunications networks, computers, information and communications systems, and embedded processors and controllers related to maritime processes and functions. 18 19 20 21 22 IT passes and manipulates information for users while OT allows interaction with the physical environment to control machines such as cranes, pumps, and steering systems. The technology ecosystem within the MTS adapts and evolves with faster and more efficient solutions. Public, private, and international MTS stakeholders implement various maritime cybersecurity standards, satisfying domestic, and as appropriate, international standards. Shipboard IT and OT systems are increasingly cross-connected, requiring internet connections to monitor, update, and input maritime data. The interdependency increases potential risk of unauthorized access and provides additional avenues through which to conduct malicious cyberattacks to shipboard systems. Additionally, a large part of the MTS relies on outdated telecommunication infrastructure, threatening MTS stakeholders’ ability to protect digital 17 United States Department of Transportation, 2020 Goals and Objectives for a Stronger Maritime Nation: A Report to Congress, February 2020, page 6. 18 Department of Homeland Security Transportation Security Administration (TSA), 2020 Biennial National Strategy for Transportation Security Report to Congress, David P. Pekoske, 2020, page 35. 19 Director National Intelligence, Unifying Intelligence Strategy for Maritime, National Intelligence Manager Maritime, March 2020. 27 Department of Commerce, Special Publication 800-53 revision 4: Security and Privacy Controls for Federal Information 21 National Security Agency, Committee on National Security Systems Glossary (CNSSI 4009), 06-April-2015, page 40. 22 Department of Commerce, Special Publication 800-53 revision 4: Security and Privacy Controls for Federal Information Systems and Organizations, National Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST), 22-January-2015. A-5