We welcome the importance the report gives to the need to narrow the “gender digital divide”
and of promoting effective and meaningful participation and leadership of women in multilateral
processes such as the OEWG. We believe that the gender dimension of cyber security,
including the need for more gender-related data to address the gender impacts of cyber
security policies and capacity building efforts, should be mainstreamed throughout the report.
We welcome reference to a multi-stakeholder approach in the report and the usefulness of the
intersessional informal consultations. These references highlight the importance of a multistakeholder approach to the ICT environment. Switzerland would like to suggest integrating
this understanding throughout the report, including by highlighting that non-state actors have
an essential role to play in contributing to building trust and confidence in the use of ICTs, as
well as in supporting implementation of the framework of responsible behavior of States in
cyberspace. Also, involvement and meaningful participation of non-state actors should be
maintained and formalized for future institutional dialogue and this should be reflected in the
report.
The proposed conclusions and recommendations also reflect, in our view, the discussions in
our group and provide a good basis for further deliberation. The majority of the proposed
recommendations address various concerns expressed over the course of our work to date.
At the same time, we identified room for further clarification and sharpening of the conclusions
and recommendations.
II. Detailed remarks
A. Introduction
Paras. 1, 3, 8
Switzerland agrees that the report of the OEWG be situated in the broader perspective and
purpose of the United Nations. It has long been acknowledged that the three pillars of the UN
– human rights, sustainable development and peace and security – are interdependent and
mutually reinforcing. We believe that this “cross-pillar” approach to the prevention of conflict
and the maintenance of international peace and security could be brought out more strongly.
Para. 3
Switzerland agrees with expanding on the dual-use nature of ICTs in the introductory section
of the report. At the same time and in line with the discussions at the OEWG, this paragraph
could focus more clearly on the existing agreement that States engage for a peaceful
cyberspace and peaceful use of ICTs.
Para. 12
Switzerland welcomes the remarks made in this paragraph.
B. Existing and Potential Threats
In line with the guiding question for the second OEWG session relating to the assessment of
existing and emerging threats as outlined in the GGE reports of 2010, 2013 and 2015,
Switzerland believes that it would be important to reflect that this assessment remains valid.
Also, we agree with the assessment that increasing connectivity and reliance on ICTs may
bring unintended risks, as well as unintended consequences and unintended harmful effects.
Para. 14
We believe it is important to specify that not only the possession by non-state actors of ICT
capabilities previously limited to States is of concern, but also the possibility that these ICT
capabilities could be used for malicious purposes by these actors.
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