The draft should also include new norms; among others the following: “States should not conduct ICT operations intended to disrupt the technical infrastructure essential to political processes, such as elections, referenda or plebiscites.” E. Confidence-building Measures In this section, the draft should reflect the importance to encourage the tailoring and conduct of exercises to test or practice complex and realistic scenarios that may impact their ecosystem, taking into consideration the participation of multiple State holders, including CERTs, CSIRTs, policymakers, diplomats, and other relevant actors. Also, it is key to prioritise the establishment of a list of a national contact point at the senior diplomatic level to facilitate work for cooperation and international dialogues on cybersecurity and cyberspace. Ciberdiplomacy plays an instrumental role on building confidence among States, therefore cybersecurity and cyberspace issues should be incorporated in training courses and training for diplomats and officials of the Ministries of Foreign Affairs and other government agencies. F. Capacity-building There is a need for a comprehensive and progressive vision on the subject, which should necessarily include a gender approach and a sustainable development dimension in all capacity-building strategies. Ecuador insists on the need for the recognition of asymmetries in the capacity to implement norms, rules and principles of responsible behaviour of the States. With regard to paragraph 56, when implementing cyber security strategies and when delivering cyber capacity building, States should consider: i) integrating their obligations to protect, promote and uphold women’s human rights as part of their cybersecurity strategies; ii) utilising Women Peace and Security National Action Plans in line with the Security Council adopted resolution No 1325, or opportunities provided by other frameworks to advance women’s participation within international cybersecurity, alongside their protection; iii) conducting gender reviews of national or regional cybersecurity policies to identify areas for improvement; iv) maintaining sex- or genderdisaggregated participation records for all cybersecurity-related work (diplomacy, capacity building, incident response, etc.); and recognising that capacity-building must be gender-sensitive and gender diverse. G. Regular Institutional Dialogue Ecuador appreciates the way the Chair structured this section. In addition to the recommendations contained in the NAM working Paper that could improve the draft, Ecuador wishes to stress the importance of establishing a list available to all Members of a national contact point at the senior diplomatic level to facilitate work for cooperation and international dialogues on cybersecurity and cyberspace. ❖ 3