A. Introduction
We welcome the manner in which the context of our discussions is set out, clearly noting the
relevance of developments in the field of ICTs to all three pillars of United Nations (UN)
activity (A1) and particularly noting the importance of the opportunities inherent therein (A2).
The description of the sections of the pre-draft as ‘complementary and interdependent’ (A12)
is helpful and reflective of our discussions. We are also pleased to see substantive
references to the participation and leadership of women in decision-making processes (A9).
We suggest caution in the reference to ‘civilian and military applications’ (A3) which appears
set to define a separation in technologies from the outset of the pre-draft. Whilst our
mandate expresses concern about the development of capabilities for military purposes, it is
also careful to describe them as ‘dual-use technologies’. This distinction makes clear that it
is the way in which the technology is used that can be problematic, and not that the
technology itself is inherently civilian or military.
We note that the reference to the OEWG being ‘uniquely positioned’ (A6) is a theme which
recurs throughout the pre-draft. The UK fully supports both the inclusive nature of the OEWG
and the fundamental importance of these discussions. However, we also recognise the
existence of other important discussions forums, including the Group of Governmental
Experts (GGE), which bring their own important contributions to the global debate. As such,
we are reluctant to rank one above another but seek to engage in each on their own merits.
We suggest strengthening references to the complementarity of the OEWG and GGE
processes (A4/A5) and encourage all references to the elements of our framework (A5) to
include the fact that they are ‘underpinned by capacity building’.
B. Potential Threats
We welcome the approach to concerns regarding specific technological trends and the
requirement for a technologically neutral approach (B18). We endorse the approach taken
in Chapeau B to frame the discussion but consider it could be clarified. It could start with the
main factors that have led to a change in levels of risk – increased sophistication and
ubiquitous technology, before moving onto the nature of threat that is enabled by these
changes – increased frequency of attacks, increased vulnerability etc. We do not recognise
the increased precision of attacks as a threat. Indeed, we consider this may be positive in
terms of reduction of any potential for so-called ‘collateral damage’.
The current draft does not accurately reflect the discussion related to the development or
use of offensive ICT capabilities (B15). Whilst we recognise that some States held concerns
about the ‘militarisation of cyberspace’, others – including the UK – also clearly recognised
that ICT capabilities can be developed and used, in a manner consistent with international
law and called on States to be transparent about the existence of their own capabilities.
Indeed, as the UK noted in its intervention in February, the use of ICTs in military contexts
may be preferable to use of kinetic weapons and can be de-escalatory.
Overall, we suggest the pre-draft would benefit from additional text early in this section
identifying the threat from States that undertake activity that is not in line with their
obligations under international law or the expectations of the international community
outlined by the norms of responsible State behaviour. Such behaviours undermine trust and
stability in the system and increase the risk of misperception. We also note that discussion
regarding the consequences and the impact of cyber operations such as the loss of life, and
negative impact on economies, development, and human rights could be emphasised here.