sovereignty may inter alia involve its territorial dimension; in this regard, the following categories of cases may be relevant (without excluding the possibility of other cases): Germany essentially concurs with the view proffered, inter alia, in the Tallinn Manual 2.0 that cyber operations attributable to a State which lead to physical effects and harm in the territory of another State constitute a violation of that State’s territorial sovereignty.17 This encompasses physical damage to cyber infrastructure components per se and physical effects of such damage on persons or on other infrastructure, i.e. cyber or analogue infrastructure components connected to the damaged cyber component or infrastructure located in the vicinity of the damaged cyber infrastructure (provided a sufficient causal link can be established). Germany generally also concurs with the view expressed and discussed in the Tallinn Manual 2.0 that certain effects in form of functional impairments with regard to cyber infrastructures located in a State’s territory may constitute a violation of a State’s territorial sovereignty.18 In Germany’s view, this may also apply to certain substantial non-physical (i.e. software-related) functional impairments. In such situations, an evaluation of all relevant circumstances of the individual case will be necessary. If functional impairments result in substantive secondary or indirect physical effects in the territory of the target State (and a sufficient causal link to the cyber operation can be established), a violation of territorial sovereignty will appear highly probable.19 In any case, negligible physical effects and functional impairments below a certain impact threshold cannot – taken by themselves – be deemed to constitute a violation of territorial sovereignty. Generally, the fact that a piece of critical infrastructure (i.e. infrastructure which plays an indispensable role in ensuring the functioning of the State and its society) or a company of special public interest in the territory of a State has been affected may indicate that a State’s territorial sovereignty has been violated. However, this cannot in and of itself constitute a violation, inter alia because uniform international definitions of the terms do not yet exist. Also, cyber operations in which infrastructures and/or companies which do not qualify as ‘critical’ or ‘of particular public interest’ are affected may likewise violate the territorial sovereignty of a State. b) Prohibition of wrongful intervention The prohibition of a wrongful intervention between States20 is not explicitly mentioned in the UN Charter. However, it is a corollary of the sovereignty principle, can be derived from art. 2 para. 1 UN Charter and is grounded in customary international law. Generally, for State17 18 19 20 Tallinn Manual 2.0 (note 4), rule 4, commentary, para. 11. Cf. ibid., rule 4, commentary, para. 13 (“loss of functionality”). Cf. ibid. On its applicability in the cyber context see also UN Group of Governmental Experts, report of 2015 (note 1), para. 28 (b). 4