Russia, too, will continue to claim major power status. Moscow’s foreign policy is founded on a nationalist narrative that is critical of the West and challenges the liberal order. Moscow’s power is primarily based on Russian military strength. Russia is no longer among the world’s ten largest economies. Its current GDP is comparable to South Korea’s, Spain’s or Australia’s. Reforms and a rapprochement with the West could potentially stem Russia’s relative loss of economic power, but no such domestic and foreign policy adjustments appear to be on the horizon. Given the strained global political climate, there are expectations that Europe should move closer together. A united Europe could become a world power. This is in fact one the European Union’s stated objectives. But centrifugal forces are also at work in Europe. The EU is an economic power and European countries remain global leaders when it comes to quality of life. But internal fault lines will continue to be a major concern for the EU in the foreseeable future. The EU’s biggest players are facing major domestic political problems. Protest movements are challenging the European integration process as it is presently constituted. The EU is rarely able to live up to its potential as a foreign policy actor. Its member states disagree on too many key issues. Calls for ‘strategic autonomy’ and ‘European sovereignty’ remain rather theoretical for the time being. Whether the trend is towards ‘more Europe’ or ‘less Europe’ is as yet unclear. Despite this uncertainty, or rather because of it, the single market with its four freedoms at the heart of the European integration process is likely to endure. EU member states will in all likelihood also continue to coordinate within the framework of the EU their efforts to ensure Europe’s internal security and global competitiveness. It also remains to be seen whether the West, as a transatlantic community of values, will be able to retain its power to shape policymaking. The language coming from Washington gives little room for optimism in the short term. It is clear, however, that Europe and the United States will continue to need each other in the global political landscape of the future. We should therefore not be too hasty in writing off the West just yet. 2.1.2. The international order under pressure The growing prominence of non-Western values has led to an erosion of the liberal international order. The rule of law, democracy and human rights are on the defensive. International law is under pressure. Freedom of expression is being curtailed in many countries. Facts are countered with pseudo-facts with alarming frequency – not only in autocratic countries. It is too early to tell whether this trend is a temporary setback or whether decades of progress have been irretrievably lost. The weakening of the international order is also evidenced by the fact that arms control treaties are being flouted: we are witnessing a trend towards rearmament. A future arms race between China, the United States and Russia with regional spillover effects cannot be ruled out. Strategic stability is difficult to achieve in a multipolar world. We are already facing the ever-present risk of the misuse of cyberspace for geopolitical, intelligence and military purposes. Numerous multilateral organisations are struggling to maintain their capacity to act because of growing divergences between their member states. The law of the strongest is gaining ground, especially in security and trade relations. The US historian and foreign-policy commentator Robert Kagan encapsulated this trend in the title of his 2018 book The Jungle Grows Back. Kagan’s argument overreaches, however: multilateralism is not finished, but it is changing and increasingly fragmented. Governance structures are becoming more diverse, with sometimes competing and overlapping interests. New cooperation networks are also emerging, for example between cities. Rapid worldwide urbanisation is turning cities into key players in efforts to address climate, energy and migration issues. Digitalisation is enhancing non-governmental actors’ ability to shape developments. This trend also places limits on nation states’ ability to reassert their sway. A stable new global order is unlikely to emerge any time soon from this tangled web. For small and medium-sized countries like Switzerland, whose prosperity and security depend on a rulesbased system, these trends pose a real challenge. Protecting its interests will become much more challenging for Switzerland in the years ahead. The world in 2028 – what do we have to prepare for? 4