national and international cyber defence and crisis management exercises on regular basis. The agency also 40 provides educational materials and holds training sessions for their constituents. The near-term goals of GovCERT-Hungary are to develop and establish full scale, dynamic malware analysis, automated log analysis, higher event correlations, and remote examinations. Other aims are to create an 41 online malware and knowledge database and to establish a cyber-alert early warning system. To ensure cooperation and the flow of information on higher levels on a daily basis, the National Cyber Defence Institute was established on 1 October 2015. The institute operates as an umbrella organisation, incorporating the GovCERT-Hungary, the National Electronic Information Security Authority and the Cyber 42 Defence Management Authority. The goal is to make task execution and incident handling processes more coordinated and efficient. The institute also serves as a contact point in several international forums, such as Forum of Incident Response and Security Teams, International Watch and Warning Network, and European Government CERTs Group, using the existing knowledge base coming from the cyber security organisations. Sectorial CERTs are also being established: beyond the existing critical information infrastructure protection (CIIP) CERT (operating under the National Directorate General for Disaster Management), another two are being set up, one for defence within the Military National Security Service, and another one for civilian intelligence within the Information Office. 43 In 2012, the Government adopted Hungary’s National Military Strategy. This strategy was the first official declaration of Hungary considering cyberspace as the fifth domain. According to the document, the Hungarian Defence Forces (HDF) are facing threats not just from the physical dimension but from cyberspace as well, and preparing to wage a new type of war. It concludes, ‘The characteristics of cyber threats which are different from those of conventional threats necessitate a comprehensive review and possible amendment of our concepts of war’. The political and military leaders had to face the fact that ‘nations today use computer network operations to defend sovereignty and to project power, and cyber conflicts may soon become the rule rather than the 44 exception’. This point of view has become a standard NATO approach, following the declaration at the Chicago Summit, 45 2012, that cyber capabilities are vital to achieve military goals in today’s wars. However, NATO is still rather cautious about drawing an equation mark between cyber capabilities and military capabilities. Moreover, according to the Wales Summit Declaration, 2014, ‘a decision as to when a cyber attack would lead to the 46 invocation of Article 5 would be taken by the North Atlantic Council on a case-by-case basis.’ 40 Szentgáli Gergely, ‘A magyar kibervédelem anatómiai képe, ‘ Felderítő Szemle 3 (2013): 80. <http://knbsz.gov.hu/hu/letoltes/fsz/2013-3.pdf>. 41 Balázs Bencsik: GovCERT-Hungary - Vision and Strategy. <http://konferencia.infoter.eu/_dwl/D%C3%ADszterem/7/14051420%20-%20dr.%20bencsik%20bal%C3%A1zs.pdf>. 42 The organisational design of the Institution follows a model also used in Germany (Federal Office for Information Security) and in the Netherlands (National Cyber Security Centre). 43 1656/2012 (20 December) Government Decree on Hungary’s National Military Strategy. <http://20102014.kormany.hu/download/b/ae/e0000/national_military_strategy.pdf#!DocumentBrowse>. 44 Kenneth Geers, ‘Pandemonium: Nation States, National Security, and the Internet,’ The Tallinn Papers 1 (2014): 12. < https://ccdcoe.org/publications/TP_Vol1No1_Geers.pdf>. 45 Szentgáli Gergely, ‘NATO Policy on Cyber Defence: The Road so Far,’ AARMS 1 (2013): 87. <http://uninke.hu/uploads/media_items/aarms-vol-12_-issue-1_-2013.original.pdf>. 46 Wales Summit Declaration. <http://www.nato.int/cps/en/natohq/official_texts_112964.htm>. 10