Costa Rica notes that access to and knowledge of ICTs is still unequal among different
genders and societal groups.
5. It is against this backdrop that Costa Rica presents its national position on how international
law applies to cyber operations. This is based on our fundamental national security and foreign
policy interest in fostering the development of secure, resilient, and human-centric digital
infrastructures on the basis of our core interests in protecting individuals and organizations at
risk, with a strong emphasis on privacy and digital rights; defending citizens against threats to
their freedom and dignity; promoting respect for human rights; and upholding democratic
principles and the rule of law. In doing so, it encourages other States to issue their own
national positions to foster greater transparency, clarity, and agreement around the existing
international legal framework applicable to ICTs. Costa Rica also stresses the importance of
United Nations (UN) processes dedicated to the discussion of this issue, namely the Group of
Governmental Experts (GGE) and the Open-Ended Working Group (OEWG), as well as those
under the auspices of the Organization of American States (OAS), such as the initiatives of
the Inter-American Juridical Committee. In particular, it notes the contribution of such
processes – all of which Costa Rica has participated in – to the clarification of how several
rules of international law apply to cyber operations.1 Moreover, Costa Rica notes the
importance of capacity-building and dialogue on how international law applies to ICTs to
enable and empower different States, particularly developing countries, to express their
informed views on the subject.2
6. In the preparation of its statement, Costa Rica benefited from reflecting on the views of a wide
range of States and other stakeholders including the International Committee of the Red
Cross,3 and it was guided by academic projects on the application of international law to cyber
operations, such as the Tallinn Manual, the Oxford Process, and the Cyber Law Toolkit.4
E.g., GGE, ‘Report of the Group of Governmental Experts on Developments in the Field of Information
and Telecommunications in the Context of International Security, A/70/174, 22 July 2015 (‘GGE 2015
Report’), paras 24-29; ‘Report of the Group of Governmental Experts on Advancing Responsible State
Behaviour in Cyberspace in the Context of International Security’, A/76/135, 14 July 2021 (‘GGE 2021
Report’), paras 69-73; OEWG, ‘Final Substantive Report’, 10 March 2021, A/AC.290/2021/CRP.2
(‘OEWG Final Substantive Report’), paras 34-37; OEWG ‘Annual Progress Report’, A/77/275, 8 August
2022 (‘OEWG 2022 Annual Progress Report’), Annex, para. 15; OAS, ‘Report of the Inter-American
Juridical Committee: International Law Applicable to Cyberspace’, 24 August 2022, CJI/doc. 671/22 rev.2,
24 August 2022, pp. 11-22.
2
GGE 2021 Report (n 1), para. 89(e); OEWG Final Substantive Report (n 1), para. 39; OEWG 2022
Annual Progress Report (n 1), para. 15(d).
3
See ICRC, International Humanitarian Law and Cyber Operations during Armed Conflicts, Position
Paper, 2019.
4
See M. Schmitt (ed.), Tallinn Manual 2.0 on the International Law Applicable to Cyber Operations (2017)
(‘Tallinn Manual 2.0’); University of Oxford, The Oxford Process on International Law Protections in
Cyberspace: A Compendium (2022), available at: https://www.elac.ox.ac.uk/wpcontent/uploads/2022/10/Oxford-Process-Compendium-Digital.pdf; Cyber Law Toolkit, available at:
https://cyberlaw.ccdcoe.org/.
1
2