frameworks for assessing the risk profile of suppliers assessment report, these factors could include national-specific information such as market penetration of suppliers, threat intelligence from national security services, etc. d) Resilience and continuity SA07 Improving coordination in incident response and crisis management SA08 Conducting audits of interdependencies between 5G networks and other critical services e) Cooperation and coordination Enhancing cooperation, coordination and SA09 information sharing mechanisms Through the ongoing work within the dedicated NIS Work stream, ensure there are good cooperation and coordination mechanisms between the relevant national authorities and at EU level when dealing with large-scale cross-border cybersecurity incidents and crises, on the basis of the Blueprint 43. Moreover, to prepare for large-scale incidents involving 5G networks, Member States could consider including 5G scenarios in national as well as EU-wide cyber exercises, where appropriate. Analyse critical dependencies between the 5G networks and other critical sectors, such as electricity supply, as well as sectoral dependencies for 5G, such as drinking water and transportation. This should also consider circular dependencies (e.g. 5G network dependent on power supply and, at the same time, power being dependent on 5G network). Consider the use of existing cooperation, coordination and information sharing mechanisms, including actions and support by ENISA, notably through regular threat assessments.  Relevant authorities  ENISA  Relevant authorities  Relevant authorities  ENISA TM11 TM11 TM01, TM05, TM09, TM10 43 Commission Recommendation on a coordinated response to large-scale cybersecurity incidents & crisis (EU 2017/1584). 29