58 Fifth Report Annex B The lack of any public U.S. endorsement of due diligence as a legal rule in either the GGE context or elsewhere may be indicative of U.S. doubts as to its legal status. 50. In the June 2020 Chatham House discussion, several Member States expressed support for due diligence as an (important) rule of international law in the cyber context. However, one Member State’s representative did express some hesitation about endorsing due diligence given the risk of non-compliance that might occur for States unable to adequately respond to cyberthreats because of a lack of technical capacity. Question 10 Are there other rules of international law that your government believes are important to highlight in assessing the regulation of cyber operations by States or actors for which a State is internationally responsible? 51. The final, tenth, question invited States to identify additional areas of international law on which the Committee should focus improving transparency in the cyber context. Responses focused on different issues. Bolivia called for more attention to protecting people’s “fundamental rights” wherever they operate, including in cyberspace.133 Several other responses focused on cybercrime, particularly the Council of Europe’s Budapest Convention.134 Others emphasized the contributions of the Tallinn Manuals.135 huge sections of the population, such as the case of critical infrastructure, hospitals, public transportation, and other infrastructure affecting state security.”136 Guyana suggested that “it might be prudent to have a set of international law principles that are tailored to the special nature of cyberspace,” noting that existing legal principles were developed for a different time and context.137 53. In the June 2020 Chatham House consultations, multiple Member States called for more attention to the duty of non-intervention (and the question of what cyber activities constitute coercion). Several participants echoed a call for more attention to legal issues “below” the use of force threshold set by the UN Charter’s Article 2(4) prohibition. Others suggested less focus on issues of international peace and security in favor of more attention to the application of international human rights law to cyberspace. Additional topics receiving attention included diplomatic law, the principle of good faith, countermeasures, and the standards of proof for attribution of cyber operations to a State. 54. Finally, at least one participant called for developing a distinctly Latin American perspective on the international governance and legal framework of cyberspace. The participant noted how most ideas on international law in cyberspace have been developed by European States, or scholars from the Global North. Instead of duplicating existing efforts (e.g. UN GGE, UN OEWG, etc.), Latin American countries could build on these foundations to develop a Latin American framework for understanding international law in cyberspace based on a shared political culture of democratic institutions and Ibero-American history. The OAS was cited as the ideal venue for articulating such a shared vision. 52. Two States – Ecuador and Guyana – indicated that there may be a need for new international law in the cyber context. Ecuador emphasized establishing how “to regulate attacks against military and/or civilian targets that affect the Bolivia Response, supra note 1, at 6-7. Guatemala Response, supra note 1, at 4; Bolivia Response, supra note 1, at 6-7. 135 Costa Rica Response, supra note 1, at 2 (emphasizing Costa Rican interest in joining the Budapest Convention); Guatemala Response, supra note 1, at 4 (citing the Budapest Convention). 133 134 Inter-American Juridical Committee Ecuador Response, supra note 1, at 3. Guyana Response, supra note 1, at 5-6 (emphasizing anonymity as a particular challenge to applying existing law). 136 137 International Law and State Cyber Operations 59