12 Improving Transparency: International Law and State Cyber Operations what cautious) attempt to meet that need in the region. It is not designed to substitute for—or compete with—the ongoing U.N. processes. Rather, it aims to supplement those efforts by allowing all the voices in this region to participate and explore the full panoply of international law’s application to State behavior in cyberspace. In this sense, the Committee’s work aligns with the European Union’s call that all U.N. Member States “should submit national contributions on the subject of how international law applies to the use of [information and communication technologies] by States.”21 11. The current project has sought to meet the need for greater regional transparency through two different methods: (i) a questionnaire prepared in concert with the OAS Department of International Law (with input from the ICRC) and first circulated to Member States in February 2019; and (ii) an informal discussion with legal representatives of Member States under “Chatham House” rules (i.e., statements made during the meeting can be repeated but the identities of speakers and other participants remain confidential). A copy of the questionnaire is included at Annex A to this report. 12. My third report provided an update on the questionnaire’s contents and asked for an extension to the response deadline, an extension with which the Committee concurred.22 My fourth report surveyed the responses received from nine States: Bolivia, Brazil, Chile, Costa Rica, Ecuador, Guatemala, Guyana, Peru, and the United States.23 Of these, seven were substantive, while the EU Statement, supra note 3. See Duncan B. Hollis, International Law and State Cyber Operations: Improving Transparency: Third Report, OEA/Ser.Q, CJI/doc 594/19 (July 24, 2019) (“Hollis, Third Report”), at http:// www.oas.org/en/sla/iajc/docs/CJI_doc_594-19.pdf. 23 See Note from the Plurilateral State of Bolivia, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, OAS Permanent Mission to the OAS Inter-American Juridical Committee, MPB-OEA-NV104-19 (July 17, 2019) (containing responses to IAJC Questionnaire from Bolivia’s Office of the Commander-in-Chief of the State Inspector General of the Armed Forces) (“Bolivia Response”); Response submitted by Chile to the OAS Inter-American Juridical Committee Questionnaire (Jan. 14, 2020) (“Chile Response”); Communication from Carole Arce Echeverria, Costa Rica, International Organizations, Department of Foreign Policy, Minister of Foreign Affairs and Worship to OAS (April 3, 2019) (including letter no. 163-OCRI2019 from Yonathan Alfaro Aguero, Office of International Cooperation and Relations to Carole Arce Echeverria, which includes a reply from the “relevant authority”—the Costa Rica Criminal Court of Appeals) (“Costa Rica Response”); Verbal Note 4-2 186/2019 from the Permanent Mission of Ecuador to the OAS (June 28, 2019) (“Ecuador 21 22 Inter-American Juridical Committee Fifth Report United States directed the Committee to its prior public statements.24 Brazil highlighted its pending work in the GGE (which its Ambassador chairs) as the forum where it would address issues of international law’s application.25 All seven substantive responses are enclosed with this report at Annex B. 13. In addition to surveying the questionnaire responses, my fourth report cataloged additional informal conversations about it in concert with consultations held by the OAS Secretariat of the Inter- American Committee against Terrorism (CICTE) with the U.N. Office for Disarmament Affairs on August 15-16, 2019, and the informal inter-sessional meeting of the OEWG. I also highlighted three larger conclusions about the state of transparency in the region with respect to international law in cyberspace: • First, that all of the responding Member States have an abiding interest in the rule of law, including the role international law can play in regulating State behavior in cyberspace. • Second, the responses reveal the unevenness of State’s legal capacities in this area. Some States evinced deep knowledge of cyber operations and the novel international legal issues they raise while others demonstrated much less familiarity with the underlying international legal rules and the particular questions their applications generate in the cyber context. This suggests a need for more international legal capacity building beyond the excellent work done to date by CICTE and several Member States.26 • Third, the low response rate to the Committee’s questionnaire suggests that States remain reluctant to be transparent in their views on Response”); Note Of. 4VM.200-2019/GJL/lr/bm, from Mr. Gabriel Juárez Lucas, Fourth Vice Minister of the Interior Ministry of the Republic of Guatemala to Luis Toro Utillano, Technical Secretariat, Inter-American Juridical Committee (June 14, 2019) (“Guatemala Response”); Note No: 105/2019 from the Permanent Mission of Guyana to the OAS (July 30, 2019) (“Guyana Response”); Response Submitted by Peru to the Questionnaire on the Application of International Law in OAS Member States in the Cyber Context (June 2019) (“Peru Response”). 24 See note 9. 25 Response by Brazil to CJI OEA Note 2.2/14/19 (July 1, 2019). 26 For more on CICTE’s activities, see http://www.oas.org/en/sms/cicte/prog-cybersecurity.asp. Beyond CICTE, several Member States have also supported legal capacity building. Canada and Mexico, for example, co-hosted a workshop with the OAS on May 30, 2019 that targeted OAS countries for a discussion of international law’s application to cyberspace. International Law and State Cyber Operations 13