Priorities of foreign policy 16 | improvements in administrative procedures, a growing trend has been observed in recent years, especially in Norway, of delaying or even blocking the incorporation of certain EU legal acts that are controversial in terms of domestic policy. The EU is expressing its displeasure with the resulting disparity between the legal acquis in the Single Market of the EU and of the EEA. In the view of the EU, this development is threatening the homogeneity of the Single MarLiechtenstein is ket. This might in time lead to distortions of competition between market participants in the EU and the EEA/EFTA states. Since the refusal of an individual EEA/EFTA state to incorporate an EU legal act within the EEA also prevents the two other EEA/EFTA states from incorporating that legal act, an increase in such blockades could soo- clearly committed to the EEA Agreement. ner or later cause the EU to call the functioning of the agreement – which has been smooth so far – into question. This might lead the EU to demand stricter rules governing the institutional procedure for incorporating EU law, thus restricting the leeway for considering special concerns of the EEA/EFTA states. For this reason, it is a high priority for Liechtenstein in the near future to persuade its EEA/EFTA partner states of the need for smooth functioning of the mechanisms for transposing EU legislation into the EEA Agreement. This is also true of the creation and safeguarding of an understanding among EU institutions that Liechtenstein is clearly committed to the EEA Agreement and is willing to support further developments of the agreement. It should be taken into account in this regard that the so far smoothly functioning two-pillar structure of the EEA – with the basic principle that each pillar speaks with one voice – might no longer be regarded as useful by the EU if Iceland joins the EU. The institutional structure of the EEA might in future also be evaluated increasingly in light of the recent parallel form of association with Schengen, in which the adoption of law by the associated states is more rapid and unconditional than within the framework of the EEA procedures. A further issue arising in recent years concerns safeguarding adequate participation of the EEA/EFTA states in the numerous new EU agencies and outsourced special autho­rities. These institutions or bodies hardly existed when the EEA Agreement entered into force, and they initially also did not cause any major problems, since they usually were appointed as advisory or executive bodies of the European Commission or in connection with the supervision of EU programs and therefore could easily be incorporated into the EEA. Adequate representation of the EEA/EFTA states was therefore always ensured. Meanwhile, how­ever, EU agencies are increasingly also being endowed with regulatory and therefore sovereign powers which previously had been vested or would have been vested in the European Commission and, for the EEA/EFTA states, the EFTA Surveillance Authority. This poses new challenges for the two-pillar structure of the EEA Agreement, since no separate, parallel institution can be granted to the EEA/EFTA states anymore, or because they are not granted equal participation in the relevant agencies of the EU, but at most an observer role. Especially in connection with the currently looming expansion of the competence of the new EU financial supervisory authorities to cover the EEA, an adequate participation of the EEA/EFTA states in these authorities is of the utmost importance, so that the binding nature of these bodies’ decisions for the EEA/EFTA states can be accepted. Achieving this goal is important to the future of the Liechtenstein financial centre, which is why negotiations in this regard with the other EEA/EFTA partner states and the EU enjoy the highest priority.