Without prejudice of the specific mentions of new threats that the section contains, Italy recalls that
several interventions have mentioned that technological advances can have a dual-use application and
that is one of the main reasons why our approach should focus on States behaviour and remain
technological neutral. The report should reflect those interventions that have supported a tech neutral
approach also because innovation happens so fast that listing every single potential threat stemming
from new advances increases the risk of uncertainty and incompleteness.
C. International Law
The report gives account of the positions expressed as regards the most discussed question on whether
existing international law, complemented by voluntary and non-binding norms, is currently sufficient
addressing State use of ICTs, or whether additional instruments are needed. While reiterating that
Italy considers that IL, in particular the Charter of the UN in its entirety, fully applies in cyberspace
and does not support a call neither for a new binding treaty nor for a political binding committee,
Italy suggests that the report reflects more appropriately the support given to this position by a
considerable part of the membership. Moreover, we would like the report to better reflect also some
additional reasonings underpinning this position, that have been presented during discussions. A drive
towards a treaty or political binding commitment as suggested by some States and highlighted in the
pre-draft report, will lead to lengthy and divisive negotiations which in turn might provoke
uncertainty on the applicability of existing international law during those foreseen negotiations.
We support the proposal to use the annual report of the Secretary General on developments in the
field of ICTs in the context of international security as well as the development of a global repository
of State practice in the application of international law.
With reference to attribution (para. 32) we reckon the advantages coming from developing a common
approach at technical level, however we stress the fact that attribution is a sovereign prerogative.
While reiterating the applicability of existing international law, we also underline the crucial
importance to build upon what has already been achieved. Initiatives to move forward may actually
lead us to step back, especially in a phase, as the current one, so challenging for multilateralism.
D. Rules, norms and principles for Responsible State Behaviour
The pre-draft report highlights the fundamental importance of rules, norms and principles for
Responsible State Behaviour in developing cyber security architecture. In order to increase our
stability and predictability, they have to be meaningfully implemented by all States. We reiterate here
the importance of the GGE as a platform for discussion at expert level of new rules, norms and
principles, while we see the OEWG as instrumental for their operationalization.
In addition, the report should more clearly acknowledge that not only - as the pre-draft points out –
do “norms reflect the expectations of the international community regarding the behaviour of States
in their use of ICTs”: rather, their continuous and widespread application is one of the conditions for
the formation of customary international law. Against this backdrop, the term “upgrading” existing
norms is misleading and we would refrain from using it. The reason being that in this context either
it is referred to customary international law and therefore norms cannot be upgraded, they become
binding through time and through their application because they are perceived as binding (opinio
juris ac necessitatis); or they won’t become customary law and it is certainly not the OEWG that
can make them change their nature.
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