NATIONAL DEFENSE STRATEGY to deter conflictPrioritize preparedness for war. Achieving peace through strength requires the Joint Force to deter conflict e will sustainablythrough preparedness for war. During normal day-to-day operations, the Joint Force will sustainably nd Middle East;compete to: deter aggression in three key regions—the Indo-Pacific, Europe, and Middle East; low the level ofdegrade terrorist and WMD threats; and defend U.S. interests from challenges below the level of ng aggression byarmed conflict. In wartime, the fully mobilized Joint Force will be capable of: defeating aggression by ent terrorist anda major power; deterring opportunistic aggression elsewhere; and disrupting imminent terrorist and nuclear strategicWMD threats. During peace or in war, the Joint Force will deter nuclear and non-nuclear strategic ain and maintainattacks and defend the homeland. To support these missions, the Joint Force must gain and maintain ips. information superiority; and develop, strengthen, and sustain U.S. security relationships. with yesterday’sModernize key capabilities. We cannot expect success fighting tomorrow’s conflicts with yesterday’s saries’ ambitionsweapons or equipment. To address the scope and pace of our competitors’ and adversaries’ ambitions ned, predictableand capabilities, we must invest in modernization of key capabilities through sustained, predictable ments has grownbudgets. Our backlog of deferred readiness, procurement, and modernization requirements has grown iplined increasesin the last decade and a half and can no longer be ignored. We will make targeted, disciplined increases al Defense Strategyin personnel and platforms to meet key capability and capacity needs. The 2018 National Defense Strategy n programs andunderpins our planned fiscal year 2019-2023 budgets, accelerating our modernization programs and age. devoting additional resources in a sustained effort to solidify our competitive advantage. uclear command, n of the nuclear s, predicated on  Nuclear forces. The Department will modernize the nuclear triad—including nuclear command, control, and communications, and supporting infrastructure. Modernization of the nuclear force includes developing options to counter competitors’ coercive strategies, predicated on the threatened use of nuclear or strategic non-nuclear attacks. investments in e will also invest ties into the full  Space and cyberspace as warfighting domains. The Department will prioritize investments in resilience, reconstitution, and operations to assure our space capabilities. We will also invest in cyber defense, resilience, and the continued integration of cyber capabilities into the full spectrum of military operations. aissance (C4ISR). networks and stments will also ors those same nst and holding  Command, control, communications, computers and intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance (C4ISR). Investments will prioritize developing resilient, survivable, federated networks and information ecosystems from the tactical level up to strategic planning. Investments will also prioritize capabilities to gain and exploit information, deny competitors those same advantages, and enable us to provide attribution while defending against and holding accountable state or non-state actors during cyberattacks. e capabilities for  Missile defense. Investments will focus on layered missile defenses and disruptive capabilities for both theater missile threats and North Korean ballistic missile threats. rse targets inside n platforms. This  Joint lethality in contested environments. The Joint Force must be able to strike diverse targets inside adversary air and missile defense networks to destroy mobile power-projection platforms. This will include capabilities to enhance close combat lethality in complex terrain. r, sea, and space ains while under maller, dispersed, prioritized.  Forward force maneuver and posture resilience. Investments will prioritize ground, air, sea, and space forces that can deploy, survive, operate, maneuver, and regenerate in all domains while under attack. Transitioning from large, centralized, unhardened infrastructure to smaller, dispersed, resilient, adaptive basing that include active and passive defenses will also be prioritized. 6 6