jurisdiction, international cooperation and ISP responsibility and liability. The last decade has seen significant developments in the promulgation of international and regional instruments aimed at countering cybercrime. These include binding and non-binding instruments. Five clusters can be identified, consisting of instruments developed in the context of, or inspired by: (1) the Council of Europe or the European Union, (2) the Commonwealth of Independent States or the Shanghai Cooperation Organization, (3) intergovernmental African organizations, (4) the League of Arab States, and (5) the United Nations. A significant amount of cross-fertilization exists between all instruments, including, in particular, concepts and approaches developed in the Council of Europe Convention on Cybercrime (the “Budapest Convention”). ƒƒThere is a risk of partition between cooperating with shared cybercrime procedures and non-cooperating states (see section 3 A, below): Current international cooperation risks fall into two country clusters: those states that have implemented reciprocal powers and procedures to cooperate among themselves, and those that have failed to implement those measures, are restricted to “traditional” modes of international cooperation that take no account of the specificities of electronic evidence and the global nature of cybercrime. Such a concern is particularly true of investigative actions. The lack of a common approach, including within current multilateral cybercrime instruments, means that even simple requests for actions, such data preservation, may not be easily fulfilled. ƒƒRegulatory frameworks must maintain data integrity while protecting freedoms: Regulatory frameworks, essential to the fight cybercrime, must be sufficiently bolstered to assure freedom of speech and access to information. Relatedly, while data protection laws generally require personal data to be deleted when no longer required, some states have made exceptions for purposes of criminal investigation, requiring ISPs to store specific types of data for a set period of time. Many developed countries also have rules requiring organizations to notify individuals and regulators of data breaches. Also, while it might be technically possible for ISPs to filter content, any restrictions that they place on internet access are subject to both foreseeability and proportionality requirements under international human rights law protecting rights to seek, receive and impart information. ƒƒThe question of holding ISPs liable: Following directly on from the previous matter is the question of whether, and to what extent, to hold ISPs liable for objectionable content is a vast one. In many legal systems, ISPs may be held liable for failing to control or constrain illegal content or activity crossing their systems. In other systems, however, that liability is limited on the basis that ISPs are “mere conduits” of data. That said, where liability is limited, it can often shift to a requirement to take action if an element of content-awareness becomes apparent—for instance, where the ISP modifies transmitted content or if actual or constructive knowledge of illegal activity or content is shown. ƒƒPPPs are central to cybercrime prevention: PPPs are created as much by informal agreement as by legal basis. Private sector entities tend to be most frequently involved in partnerships, followed by academic institutions, and then by international and regional organizations. PPPs are mostly used to facilitate knowledge sharing, though they have been used, especially by private-sector entities, to prompt investigation and legal actions. Such actions complement those of law enforcement and can help mitigate damage to victims. Academic institutions play a variety of roles in preventing cybercrime, including training, developing law and policy development, and technical standards setting, as well as housing cybercrime experts, computer emergency response teams CIRTs and specialized research centers. Page 26 | Chapter 1 | § B. Phenomenon & Dimensions of Cybercrime Table of Contents

Select target paragraph3