CHAPTER 8. CIRCUMSTANCES EXCLUDING CRIMINALITY OF ACT Article 36. Necessary Defense (1) Infliction of harm to trespasser as a necessary defense, i.e. in protecting personality and rights of the defender or other persons, interests of society and the state shall not be recognized as crime unless with excess of bounds of necessary defense. (2) Any person is entitled to necessary defense regardless of opportunity to avoid trespassing or request help from other persons or authorities. (3) Excess of limits of necessary defense is a flagrant inconsistence between the defense and the nature and danger of trespassing. Infliction of harm to trespasser through carelessness shall not lead to criminal liability. Article 37. Extreme Necessity (1) Infliction to legally protected interests under extreme necessity, i.e. aimed at elimination of threat to individuality and rights of this person and other persons, interests of society and the state, shall not be recognized a crime unless such threat could be eliminated by other means and if such infliction is less significant than that prevented. (2) Excess of bounds of extreme necessity is infliction flagrantly inconsistent with the nature and danger of threat and circumstances under which the threat was eliminated when such interests were trespassed to extent equal to or more significant than the harm prevented. In such case, infliction through carelessness shall not lead to criminal liability. Article 38. Trespassing in Detention of Person that Committed a Crime (1) Infliction of harm to a person in detention of such at the time or immediately after the crime committed by the detainee, with the purpose of passing the detainee to authorities, shall not be recognized a crime unless with flagrant inconsistence of detention measures with the nature and degree of social danger of detainee's acts and with detention circumstances. (2) Excess of measures necessary for detention of a person that committed a socially dangerous act is a flagrant inconsistence of means and methods of detention with the danger of the act and the doer, as well with detention circumstances, resulted in intended harm to the detainee not caused by necessity of detention. In this case, infliction through carelessness shall not lead to criminal liability. Article 39. Execution of Order (1) Infliction of harm in lawful execution of order by a person, as well as fulfillment of duties provided for by position of such person, shall not be recognized a crime. (2) A person that committed a crime under knowingly criminal order shall be held criminally liable on common grounds.