44 DANISH CYBER AND INFORMATION SECURITY STRATEGY 2022-2024 Robust protection of vital societal functions 1.1 Strengthening security around vital societal functions Ministerial areas responsible for vital societal functions that are significantly IT-enabled are required to develop cyber and information security strategies and establish a decentralised cyber and information security unit (DCIS). The strategies will initially cover state-owned critical ICT infrastructure and in the next phase address the private, regional and municipal sectors. 1.2 Critical ICT systems in the central government need to be more secure New cyber and information security requirements are introduced for government agencies responsible for ICT systems critical to society. Since a significant part of the government’s ICT systems critical to society are currently outsourced to private suppliers, the possibility for the government to take over the ICT systems, if necessary, must also be considered if the supplier in question goes bankrupt or decides to liquidate its business. 1.3 Better security through ISO implementation and new minimum requirements for government agencies The management of information security in the central government is strengthened by increasing guidance initiatives in relation to ISO 27001. At the same time, security is strengthened through the further development of minimum technical requirements, which are mandatory for all government agencies. 1.4 Greater focus on ICT security in public ICT procurement In order to improve cyber and information security among public authorities, it needs to be identified how ICT security aspects can be better integrated into public framework and procurement contracts, and whether the level of ICT security in the contracts is sufficiently transparent for the authorities. 1.5 Common technical solutions Several common solutions are being established to strengthen security among the authorities, including 1) a joint state-safe DNS service to protect government employees against phishing and malware, 2) a joint state security shield (GovShield), which, through logging and the possibility of expansion, must help identify and counter cyber threats against authorities that are not customers of the central government’s IT, 3) an effective reporting system for phishing emails (phishing portal), so that sharing information about threats and indicators of compromises is improved. In addition, 4) a National ICT Contingency Plan will be established, which authorities will have to take into account in their contingency plans.