ICTs by States; confidence-building measures; capacity-building; and the possibility of establishing regular institutional dialogue with broad participation under the auspices of the United Nations. 12. The OEWG recognizes that the individual elements comprising its mandate are interrelated and mutually reinforcing, and are to be considered through a human-centric lens. International law and norms regulate and guide State behaviour; confidence-building measures help to create trust and stability in relations between States; and capacity-building helps States adhere to their international commitments and create a resilient, secure and peaceful ICT environment. Measures that build confidence and capacity reinforce respect for international law, encourage the operationalization of norms, provide opportunities for enhanced cooperation between States, and empower each State to reap the benefits of ICTs for their societies and economies. In light of these synergies, the following sections of the report are to be considered as complementary and interdependent. 13. Sections B-G below reflect the substantive discussions of the OEWG and its recommendations. B. Existing and Potential Threats Despite the invaluable benefits of ICTs for humanity, their malicious use can have significant and farreaching negative impacts. Misuse can undermine trust within and among States, the enjoyment of human rights and the potential for economic and social development. There is growing concern about the potential implications of the malicious use of ICTs for the maintenance of international peace and security. Harmful ICT incidents are increasing in frequency, precision and sophistication, and are constantly evolving and diversifying. Increasing connectivity and reliance on ICTs may also bring unintended risks, making societies more vulnerable to malicious ICT activities. 14. In their discussions at the OEWG, States expressed concern at the malicious use of ICTs carried out by State actors, including the possible use of proxies. It was also noted that some ICT capabilities previously only available to States were now accessible to non-State actors, including terrorists and criminals. 15. States expressed the view that the development or use of offensive ICT capabilities, as well as the stockpiling of vulnerabilities, are contributing to the militarization of the digital space. Pursuit of increasing automation and autonomy in ICT operations was also put forward as a specific concern. States highlighted as a central threat the possibility that ICTs could be used in a manner inconsistent with a State’s obligations under international law. Additional concerns were conveyed regarding interference in the internal affairs of States through the use of ICTs, including by means of information operations and disinformation campaigns. Concerns were also raised about the exploitation of harmful hidden functions and the integrity of global ICT supply chains. 16. States underscored that a lack of awareness, resilience and adequate capacities constitutes a threat in and of itself as all countries are increasingly reliant on digital technologies. 17. It was noted that threats may have a differentiated impact on different actors, including on youth, the elderly, women and men, on vulnerable populations, particular professions, and other categories of actors, as well as on States with different levels of ICT security and resilience. 3