Supporting sanctions infrastructure 39 32. The Subsidiary Organs Branch should organise private meetings between the outgoing and incoming chairs to discuss the Committee’s work and encourage the preparation of written handover notes. 33. The Subsidiary Organs Branch should develop a comprehensive induction programme for incoming chairs and vice-chairs focused on management and procedural dimensions of sanctions committees. The Branch should consult with UNITAR, the Permanent Mission of Finland and Security Council Report, to ensure sanctions elements complement the content of the Branch’s induction programme. Such an induction should also clearly set out the substantive and administrative support provided by the Secretariat. 34. A short how-to (or “dos and don’ts”) guide on chairing a subsidiary body should be commissioned as a reference for incoming members of the Council, drawing heavily on the experiences of committee members and former chairs of sanctions regimes. 35. More in-depth training on specific sanctions regimes and the working methods of sanctions committees should be conducted for incoming, workinglevel delegates who support the chairs, as well as for those sitting on specific sanctions committees. Training should include orientation on how the overall sanctions machinery fits into the UN system. Similar training should be provided, where possible, to new delegates from any member of the Council when they arrive at UN Headquarters. B. Expert groups As the Security Council’s “eyes and ears on the ground”, expert groups operate in challenging security and political environments. Their operational challenges are compounded by time-bound mandates, which compel experts to report to the Council at fixed times, irrespective of the stage of their investigations or security developments on which they are reporting. As is common with many UN institutions, the resources dedicated for their use are insufficient to meet the demands of their mandate. The contribution of expert groups to the effectiveness of Security Council sanctions depends upon the personal and professional qualities of the experts themselves. They must be genuinely expert in the field to which they were appointed, but they must also have the personal strength to endure the rigours of fieldwork in often dangerous environments and to maintain their independence and impartiality in the face of political pressure. Attracting, selecting, and retaining the best experts, in an accountable and transparent manner, are therefore critical for their credibility and