applies to ICTs, it is premature to suggest that international law needs to be changed or developed further. o Recommendations in paragraph 68(a) should flow only from those proposals that enjoyed consensus. Only a few States supported a recommendation that the International Law Commission (ILC) study national views and practice on how international law applies to the use of ICTs by States. In addition, that recommendation is inconsistent with the General Assembly’s decision to ask the OEWG and the GGE to address this issue, and it duplicates other recommendations in the draft report that were supported by many more States, such as the call for voluntary submissions of national practice and views on the applicability of international law. - Second, the report should reflect a balanced view of international law. o To the extent that the next draft identifies specific international law obligations, it should also identify relevant rights that States have under international law. For example, paragraph 23 correctly identifies the obligation to refrain from the threat or use of force against the territorial integrity or political independence of any State, but it fails to mention that States may respond to such unlawful actions, consistent with the inherent right of self-defense. The right of self-defense recognized in Article 51 of the UN Charter plays an important deterrent role and helps to ensure the maintenance of international peace and security. Comments on the Norms Section The United States views voluntary, non-binding norms of State behavior during peacetime as essential components of a framework of responsible State behavior in cyberspace. The set of norms identified in the 2015 GGE report remain some of the most important recommendations affirmed by UN Member States in the area of international cyber stability. We continue to believe that the OEWG will be most productive in this area if we focus our efforts on the implementation of existing consensus norms, not the creation of entirely new normative concepts. When considering proposals from Member States, we should first explore whether the ideas could be considered articulations of existing areas of norms consensus. This could also help us avoid reconsidering concepts, such as concerns about harmful hidden functions, which the 2015 GGE report already addressed. In addition, selective elaboration of norms or identification of specific critical infrastructure sectors carries some risk of giving precedence to certain issues over others. We do not want the OEWG unintentionally to undermine the broader set of norms addressed in the 2015 GGE report. We should therefore approach this exercise in a cautious and inclusive manner. Separately, the term “upgrading” is unclear, so we suggest its deletion. If “upgrading” means “transforming” a norm from a non-binding status to a legally binding status, the OEWG has no