The Council of Europe Convention on Cybercrime, which entered into force in Switzerland on 1 January 2012, obliges the contracting states to criminalise computer fraud, data theft, document forgery with the aid of a computer and penetration of a protected computer system. The Convention governs how evidence in the form of electronic data can be collected and stored during a criminal investigation. The investigating authorities should be able to access electronic data rapidly in order to prevent its forgery or destruction in the course of the proceedings. The Swiss Criminal Code and its criminal law provisions, particularly the provisions of so-called computer criminal law in the Swiss Criminal Code (SCC) 29, especially Articles 143, 144bis and 272-274 are applicable in cybercrime cases. The Council of Europe Convention also governs international cooperation between states in criminal matters (e.g. mutual assistance and extradition). Cooperation between the various countries should be organised rapidly and efficiently. 3.7 Conclusion The analysis of existing structures shows that there are many capabilities present in the private sector (particularly major ICT service providers and system suppliers), in the Confederation and in the cantons that make it possible to comprehend the cyber aspects of existing missions and responsibilities and thus identify the associated risks. There are also approaches and concepts for improving the cyber security situation and means that enable the exchange of information and coordination between individual players. Large companies, cantonal police forces and the Confederation have units with specialist expertise. Various Swiss research institutions also run projects relating to cyber security and the identification and assessment of cyber risks. Often, however, all the stakeholders from the technical and operating level to the strategic and political level are not included in the processes, or they abstain deliberately. Surveys with representatives from the private sector and CI operators also show that large gaps and weaknesses exist for dealing with cyber attacks. Therefore, the capabilities and perceptions at the various levels vary considerably; they are often inadequate, only partially coordinated and largely dictated by commercial interests. The measures planned or introduced to improve cyber security reflect differing risk assessments and are correspondingly heterogeneous. They lead to uncoordinated approaches; the exchange of information between the players barely functions and is often limited to a single entity or area. Cyber security deficiencies are often due to a lack of financial and human resources. This applies not only to the private sector, but also particularly to the Confederation, where human resources are insufficient, with the result that even in a normal situation core tasks can only be performed in a sketchy manner. Another problem is the generally perceived lack of ICT specialists. In terms of cooperation between the private sector and the authorities, there are various weak points and a need for clarification regarding the distribution of tasks, capabilities and powers. The analysis of existing structures showed in particular that the Federal Administration lacks sufficient means for identifying risks and comprehensively evaluating information and situation assessments for the private sector, CI operators and authorities. Consequently, satisfactory cyber risk protection cannot be achieved due to an insufficient exchange of information. Moreover, cooperation with critical ICT service providers and 29 SR 311.0 Swiss Criminal Code of 21 December 1937 26/42