forums like the UN GGE and the Open Ended Working Group. In parallel, over the last few years, we have been gradually formulating and developing our views on some contemporary issues relating to cyber operations. This is a meticulous and delicate process, impelled by the need for thorough legal and practical research and careful consideration of a multitude of views, together with an assessment of potential implications. Bearing in mind all these challenges, in my presentation today I would like to share with you some of the insights that we have reached thus far regarding international law applicable to cyber operations, particularly in connection with armed conflicts. My hope is that this will contribute to the current legal discourse in this field. Jus ad bellum I will start by addressing a few key issues concerning the jus ad bellum. First – and this has already been acknowledged by many others – the customary prohibition set out in Article 2(4) of the Charter of the United Nations, on “the threat or use of force” in international relations, is clearly applicable in the cyber domain. We share the support among States for the view that a cyber operation can amount to use of force if it is expected to cause physical damage, injury or death, which would establish the use of force if caused by kinetic means. For example, hacking into the computers of the railroad network of another State and programming the controls in a manner that is expected to cause a collision between trains can amount to use of force. As with any legal assessment relating to the cyber domain, as practice in this field continues to evolve, there may be room to further examine whether operations not causing physical damage could also amount to use of force. Second, when the use of force in the cyber domain, by either a State or non-State actor, can be considered as an actual or imminent armed attack, the State under attack may act in accordance with its inherent right to self-defense, as enshrined in Article 51 of the UN Charter. Of course, the exercise of this right is subject to the customary principles of necessity and proportionality. Finally, the use of force in accordance with the right of self-defense, against an armed attack conducted through cyber means, may be carried out by either cyber or kinetic means; just as use of force in self-defense against a kinetic armed attack may be conducted by kinetic or cyber means. Jus in bello I would like to move on and address some key issues concerning the applicability of the Law of Armed Conflict (LOAC) to the cyber domain. 3/9