is true that the risks are increasing and, in the geopolitical competition for power, it can be easier to put countries like Switzerland under pressure unless they form alliances with partners. The pros of an independent free trade policy can turn into cons if actors such as the EU follow suit and use their greater market power to enter into agreements that are potentially more favourable. It also remains to be seen how Switzerland can defend its independence and capacity to act in the digital sphere. Nevertheless, the advantages of pursuing an independent foreign policy outweigh the disadvantages at present. Going forward, an intelligent combination of independence and openness will be decisive. It is in Switzerland’s interest to maintain political relations with all other states and to adhere to its policy of dialogue. Independence calls for an agile foreign policy, an extensive global presence and sound knowledge of other cultures. Swiss neutrality is a trump card in the country’s independent foreign policy. It was being called into question in the 1990s, when not actually being declared obsolete. Now it is once more opening up opportunities for Switzerland. The protective function of neutrality will play a less prominent role as long as Switzerland is surrounded by the EU and NATO. Instead, neutrality gives Switzerland much greater room for manoeuvre in foreign policy terms. Thanks to its neutrality, it can propose solutions as a credible actor, with the other actors knowing that it has no hidden power-politics agenda in doing so. Neutrality is also important to the country’s host state policy and good offices. It creates fresh prospects for Switzerland in relation to digital transformation, for example: Switzerland is an ideal venue for discussing and regulating certain aspects of tomorrow’s world that are already highly politicised, such as artificial intelligence. 3.1.2. Setting regional priorities As an independent state situated between centres of power, Switzerland has an interest in maintaining an extensive geographical presence. However, it cannot be omnipresent and it cannot do everything. It will have to set priorities: Europe remains the key region for Switzerland’s prosperity and security. The EU-28’s share of global GDP (PPP) may have fallen from 21% to 16% over the last decade and now looks likely to decline further in the next 10 years. However, this trend does nothing to diminish the paramount importance of the EU single market to the Swiss economy. In 2018, 52% of all Swiss exports went to the EU and 70% of all imports came from EU countries. Even without the United Kingdom, the EU-27 will remain Switzerland’s main market, accounting for 48% of its exports and 66% of its imports (as at 2018). Defending Switzerland’s interests with regard to the EU is of strategic importance, as is working together with the EU – and not just when it comes to market access. Numerous matters that were previously considered to fall under domestic policy have taken on a European dimension in recent decades. The ability to participate in European research programmes is essential if Switzerland is to remain a hub of innovation. Issues relating to national security are also increasingly being dealt with at the European level. Switzerland needs relations with its neighbours to be stable and built on trust. Germany, France, Italy and Austria alone account for two thirds of bilateral trade with Switzerland. The volume of trade between Switzerland and Baden-Württemberg is equal to that between Switzerland and China. If and when Brexit comes to pass, full market access and a close partnership with the United Kingdom will become paramount. The transformation of Eastern Europe and Central Asia has been uneven. The dismantling of democracy and deepening of geopolitical divides is not in Switzerland’s interest. Continuing its dialogue with Russia and Turkey based on constructive criticism, stabilising the Western Balkans and resolving the conflicts in Eastern Europe and the South Caucasus remain important fields of action. Africa’s stability is also of strategic interest to Switzerland. As far as North Africa is concerned, the focus is on economic development and migration cooperation. Progress in stabilising the crisis regions south of the Sahara – stretching from Mali to Lake Chad to Somalia – is another matter of importance to Switzerland’s security. This area is marked by high fragility, conflict, terrorism, high rates of poverty and population growth. However, the problems associated with migration should not be the sole focus of attention. Non-­ European states have recognised the continent’s tremendous economic potential and are making huge investments in Africa. Even though the region currently accounts for only 1.5% of total Swiss trade, promoting the African market and encouraging the business world to make more use of the opportunities it affords is in our national interest as Africa’s economic development benefits Switzerland’s own 2028 Foreign Policy Vision 16