FOCUS: RUSSIA  trial complex. It has around 40,000 employees. At its core is the Presidential Security Service, formerly headed by the influential commander of the National Guard, General Zolotov. The Presidential Security Service's functions include organising all of the President's foreign travel. The Special Communications and Information Service is responsible for the operation and security of all information and communication equipment in state institutions. The FSO likewise runs an academy, which also serves as a training ground for other power ministries. Investigative Committee One of Putin's most important domestic political instruments of power is the Investigative Committee, which was detached from the Prosecutor General's Office in 2011. Putin uses it primarily to crack down on domestic political opponents, and it is one of the main instruments used by the Kremlin to eliminate extraparliamentary opposition. For ten years it has been headed by Alexander Bastrykin, who studied law with Putin at Leningrad University. He has an authoritarian leadership style, keeping a very close eye on politically sensitive cases, in particular. In addition to its headquarters in Moscow, the Investigative Committee has departments in many Russian cities, including St. Petersburg, Nizhny Novgorod, Yekaterinburg, Rostov-on-Don, Novosibirsk and Khabarovsk in Russia's far east. Power ministries and the economy The relationship between the power ministries is not without friction. Essentially, however, they are instructed by the Kremlin 26 SI TUATIO N R E P O RT 2018 | F I S to cooperate. The chief mediator here is Putin, who personally intervenes when rivalries between the power ministries threaten to escalate. In addition to monitoring political and social processes, the power ministries are also responsible for overseeing the economy. The Russian economy is dominated by large corporations, such as Gazprom and Rosneft, and the state banks associated with them. The FSB, in particular, exerts a great deal of influence on the business conglomerates. The corporations' security departments are usually staffed by intelligence service officers. The most important economic sectors that have close links with the power ministries are the energy industry, the financial sector, the arms industry and the telecommunications and information sector. In return, it is the business conglomerates who finance much of the state budget, and thus also the power ministries, through their tax payments. A symbiotic relationship between the power ministries and the large corporations is thus inherent in the system. The internal consolidation of the Putin system suggests that the opposition in Russia has a tough job and that the regime's dominance has become virtually unassailable. Apart from its dependency on the key figure of Putin, the only apparent potential weakness of the system at present is its dependence on oil price movements. The energy corporations traditionally finance about half the Russian state budget. The Russian oil industry is profitable down to a price of around 30 dollars per barrel. If the price falls below this threshold for an extended period of time, the Russian economy and thus the Putin system may be desta-