36 Fifth Report Annex B 14. With respect to whether a cyber operation could cross the use-of-force threshold (or that for an armed-attack28) without having violent effects, State views were mixed. Most responding States continue to find power in drawing the relevant thresholds by analogizing cyber operations to kinetic or other past operations that did (or did not) qualify as a use of force or armed attack. Some States, however, hinted at the potential to move beyond such analogies. Chile, for example, suggested that cyber operations analogous to “the threshold of necessary severity” to satisfy the requirements established by international law to be an armed attack can give rise to a right of self-defense.29 At the same time, however, Chile’s response may have left room for defining armed attacks more broadly, suggesting that “cyberattacks directed against its sovereignty, its inhabitants, its physical or information infrastructure” could qualify as such.30 15. Peru more openly admitted the “possibility of a cyber operation that does not cause violent effects being classed as a use of force or an armed attack.”31 It did so, however, based on the idea that kinetic weaponry in the past might have also been employed without causing violent effects and yet still constituted a use of force (i.e., firing a missile across another State’s territory even if it does not land in that State).32 Overall, Peru emphasized the need to differentiate “cyber-attacks” (which “cause damage to a militarily significant target, resulting in its total or partial destruction, capture, or neutralization”) from “cyber disruptions” that “cause inconvenience, even extreme inconvenience, but no direct injury or death, and no destruction of property.”33 As such, the specifics of Peru’s response emphasized evaluating the legality of cyber operations in the use of force context based on whether they “cause death or injury to persons or property.”34 16. Guatemala’s response adopted a different approach, suggesting a willingness to rethink what qualifies as “violent effects” because a cyber operation’s consequences “can be greater and more lasting, in that they threaten such sectors as health, security, and others.”35 It suggested that in the cyber context, consequences that produce “death, anxiety, and poverty” should be considered violent.36 17. Bolivia’s response suggested that the threshold might be difficult to apply in practice since the “effects of cyber-attacks will not always be immediately known” making it hard to check if there’s been a use of force. At the same time, Bolivia indicated that it would evaluate the threshold based on analogies to the kinetic context, i.e., an “armed attack” arises where “the cyber virtual attack uses unconventional means that have the same impact [as] an armed attack.”37 18. The United States did not respond to the questionnaire itself. Nonetheless, its previous statements shed some light on its views. In his seminal 2012 speech, Harold Koh indicated the U.S. preference for a contextual approach to identifying uses of force (albeit with the aforementioned caveat that the U.S. definition also would identify armed attacks): In assessing whether an event constituted a use of force in or through cyberspace, we must evaluate factors including the context of the event, the actor perpetrating the action (recognizing challenges of attribution in cyberspace), the target and location, effects and intent, among other possible issues.38 Guatemala Response, supra note 1, at 2. Id. 37 Bolivia Response, supra note 1, at 2-7 (Bolivia emphasized that the right of self-defense also encompasses “pre- emptive self-defense,” which is only available when the threat is imminent and the need for self-defense is immediate (rather than retaliatory)). 38 Koh, supra note 1, at 595 (“Cyber activities that proximately result in death, injury, or significant destruction would likely be viewed as a use of force”). The U.S. has maintained this view subsequently. 2014 US GGE Submission, supra note 1, at 734. The 2014 US GGE Submission was also appended to the 2016 US GGE Submission, suggesting continued support for its contents. 35 36 This assumes, contra the U.S. view, that there may be two different thresholds. See supra notes 22-24, and accompanying text. 29 Chile Response, supra note 1, at 2. 30 Id. at 2. 31 Peru Response, supra note 1, at 3. 32 Id. 33 Id. at 2. 34 Id. at 3. 28 Inter-American Juridical Committee International Law and State Cyber Operations 37