16 Improving Transparency: International Law and State Cyber Operations 21. At the same time, many of the June 23 participants acknowledged that some of the reasons for State silence were legal as much as they were political – several Member States continue to lack sufficient expertise on how international law may manifest itself in the cyber context to formulate a view on some of the more current, pressing questions (and if a State is unable to formulate an informed view, it has nothing to be transparent about).28 One participant put it succinctly: “we are not quite there yet” in terms of being ready to apply international law to the cyber context. 22. Third, given the results of the questionnaire and the June 23 discussion, I would make three concrete proposals for consideration by the Committee specifically and the OAS and its Member States more broadly. Proposal 1: The Committee Should Recommend that the OAS General Assembly endorse the applicability of international law to State and State-sponsored cyber operations 23. As noted, the U.N. General Assembly and several regional organizations (ASEAN, the EU) have endorsed the applicability of international law to State behavior in cyberspace. To date, however, the OAS has not done so. Such an endorsement would send a clear signal of the commitment of the organization—and the region—to the rule of law in cyberspace. A possible formulation for such a statement would be: The OAS General Assembly affirms that international law, including the United Nations Charter in its entirety, the OAS Charter, international humanitarian law, international human rights law, the duty of non-intervention, the sovereign equality of states, and the law of state responsibility, is applicable to the use of information and communication technologies (ICT) by States and those for whom States are internationally responsible. Of course, such States could be transparent about their inability to formulate a view, but it is understandable that few, if any, States would want to make such a concession publicly. 28 Inter-American Juridical Committee Fifth Report The OAS region benefits from having Member State acceptance of the application of certain international legal regimes (e.g., international humanitarian law) where global consensus has not yet been possible. I have included sovereignty in this list as well, although some Member States may raise concerns about how it applies. In any case, by taking a clear stand on what rules of international law apply, the OAS could contribute to this global conversation, and, in so doing, advance the rule of law. 24. Alternatively – or as an interim step – the Committee itself could endorse such a formulation in one of its own resolutions and forward it to the General Assembly for its consideration. Proposal 2: Retain this Topic on the Committee Agenda and Expand its Scope beyond topics of international law for international peace and security 25. Although my term on the Committee expires at the end of the calendar year, this agenda item would undoubtedly benefit from further attention by the Committee. This is the case whether or not the Committee (or the General Assembly) acts on my first proposal. Participants in the June 23 discussion were enthusiastic about the possibility of further diplomatic exchanges. With the assistance of the Department of International Law, the Committee could continue to host such diplomatic exchanges periodically. Their low stakes and low barriers to entry would provide opportunities to identify convergence and divergence in State views that may be subsequently marshalled against the threat of under-regulated, and to date, largely unfettered State-sponsored cyber operations. 26. With more time and effort, it might be possible to elicit further “official” views form Member States to help serve the overall goal of improving transparency on how international law applies to cyberspace. In doing so, moreover, the Committee might consider expanding the scope of application to cover topics other than international peace and security, which dominate the existing U.N. processes. My questionnaire did not, for example, address the duty of non-intervention, even as a number of State representatives called for further attention to that topic in my June 23 consultations. Similarly, sev- International Law and State Cyber Operations 17