Security Vulnerabilitieslxiii that take as their starting position to disclose weaknesses found. The risks entailed by a decision not to disclose vulnerabilities in view of the specific characteristics of cyber space should be duly considered in these kinds of decision-making frameworks. Institute for International Cyber Stability  States should develop their domestic process for vulnerability disclosure for their own country. For example, see the US Vulnerabilities Equities Process at the White House. If many States were to develop such a process then it would be possible for States to share the information gained from this process re remedies at the global level. Kaspersky  The norm should address both the creating of coordinated vulnerability handling and mitigation processes where Member States can intake vulnerability reports from external researchers with regard to state networks and systems and thus contribute to enhancing their security and resilience.  The norm could also be operationalized through developing vulnerability equities processes by Member States (as suggested by the Global Commission on the Stability of Cyberspacelxiv), and coordinated vulnerability disclosure programs by nonstate actors.  In this regard, we highly welcome the developing efforts of several states to establish transparent policies for responsible vulnerability disclosure (for instance, policies that are set up by Australia,lxv the Netherlandslxvi), and bug bounty program running together with a third party (for instance the UK NCSC Bug Bounty Programlxvii at HackerOne or the Bug Bounty Program run by the Government Technology Agency (GovTech) and Cyber Security Agency (CSA) of Singaporelxviii).  We at Kaspersky run our program for transparent coordinated vulnerability disclosure called Vulnerability Reportlxix as well as our Bug Bounty Program together with HackerOne mentioned above.  We have recently also developed our Ethical Principles for Responsible Vulnerability Disclosure that have been inspired by guidelines from FIRST. We believe that the entire ICT ecosystem would be more secure, if other players make their vulnerability disclosure approaches transparent. Microsoft Tech Accord  As multistakeholder best practices, we would like to highlight the following: - In 2018, Kaspersky also took part in the studylxx by the Centre for Policy Studies (CEPS) under the chairmanship of Ms. Schaake – a former member of the European Parliament. Within a working group with other companies we discussed challenges to software CVD in Europe and as an outcome prepared practical recommendations to address existing challenges. - In 2020, Kaspersky took part in the UNIDIR Workshop dedicated to operationalizing cyber norms, where it was widely discussed and agreed that risks of legal proceedings and lack of transparent policies with trusted communication channels are often key challenges to the greater security of products and applications available on the market. To address that, we at Kaspersky joined the Dislose.iolxxi project to offer a safe harbor for security researchers – we pledged not to initiate legal proceedings against those who look to research our products and find vulnerabilities in there.  We encourage states to each adopt and publish respective Vulnerabilities Equities Processes (VEP), detailing how they evaluate whether to retain or disclose information on a potential ICT vulnerability, with a default position to always disclose to vendors to develop a fix and improve the security of the ICT ecosystem. Examples: - UK Equities Processlxxii - USA VEPlxxiii  Cybersecurity Tech Accord signatories believe that vulnerability management policies represent a key tool in increasing the stability of our online environment. With that in mind, we have encouraged our signatories to adopt these policies and make them available here.lxxiv We urge states to similarly encourage adoption of vulnerability management across their local ecosystems. Whilst large ICT vendors @DFAT DFAT.GOV.AU