obligations under international law that intentionally damages critical infrastructure or otherwise impairs the use and operation of critical infrastructure to provide services to the public; Australia does not conduct or knowingly support ICT activity contrary to its obligations under international law that intentionally damages critical infrastructure or otherwise impairs the use and operation of critical infrastructure to provide services to the public. Australia’s commitment to act in accordance with this norm is demonstrated by:   Public statements that Australia will act in accordance with the 2015 UNGGE norms and reports of the UNGGE (see: e.g.: Australia’s International Cyber Engagement Strategy or Australia-China High Level Dialogue Joint Statement) Public statement about the conduct and authorisation of Australia’s offensive cyber capabilities, which are always consistent with ASD’s obligations at domestic and international law, and subject to a comprehensive review and oversight framework (see, eg: Mike Burgess, Director-General ASD, speech to the Lowy Institute, Offensive cyber and the people who do it; or Conduct and Authorisation of Offensive Cyber Capability in Support of Military Operations; or information published on the Accountability page on ASD’s website). Australia’s acknowledgment of these capabilities does not contradict its commitment to a peaceful and stable online environment. Instead, by being transparent about the legal frameworks that govern their use, we send an unambiguous message that states’ activities in cyberspace have limitations and are subject to obligations, just as they are in the physical domain. Australia urges all countries likewise to be transparent and unequivocal in their commitment to develop and use ICTs in accordance with international law, as well as norms of responsible state behaviour agreed at the UN. (g) States should take appropriate measures to protect their critical infrastructure from ICT threats, taking into account General Assembly resolution 58/199 on the creation of a global culture of cybersecurity and the protection of critical information infrastructures, and other relevant resolutions; The Australian Government’s Critical Infrastructure Centre brings together expertise and capability from across the Australian Government to manage the complex and evolving national security risks from foreign involvement in Australia’s critical infrastructure. The Centre’s initial focus is on assessing the risks of sabotage, espionage and coercion in the sectors of telecommunications, electricity, gas, water and ports. In 2018, the Australian Government passed the Security of Critical Infrastructure Act 2018 (the Act) to manage the complex and evolving national security risks of sabotage, espionage and coercion posed by foreign involvement in Australia's critical infrastructure. It contains a range of powers, functions and obligations that only apply in relation to specific critical infrastructure assets in the electricity, gas, water and ports sectors. The Act has three key elements: a register of critical infrastructure assets; an www.dfat.gov.au/cyberaffairs esafety.gov.au/parents