B. Overview of Discussions 4. The OEWG process offered an opportunity for all States to express their views, concerns and aspirations in a democratic, transparent and inclusive manner. While the OEWG sought to identify areas of convergence and consensus, its discussions were also a record of the diversity of perspectives, ideas and proposals of Member States, and may serve as a useful basis for future work seeking to further develop common understandings on the use of ICTs by States in the context of international security. 5. Throughout their deliberations at the OEWG, States underscored the linkages and synergies between each of the elements of its mandate: international law governs actions and relations between States and voluntary, non-binding norms provide additional guidance on what constitutes responsible State behaviour. Both these elements reflect expectations of behaviour regarding State uses of ICTs in the context of international security. In this way, they also contribute to confidence-building by increasing transparency and cooperation between States and for reducing the risk of conflict. Capacity-building in turn is an enabler for all States to contribute to increased stability and security globally. Together, these elements constitute a global framework of cooperative measures to address existing and potential threats in the sphere of ICTs. Regular institutional dialogue will provide the opportunity for this framework to be further developed and operationalized through advancing common understandings, exchanging lessons learned and good practices in implementation, building confidence and increasing capacity amongst States. Threats 6. In their discussions at the OEWG, States raised a wide variety of existing and potential threats, which underscored that States may perceive threats emanating from the ICT environment in different ways. The inclusive OEWG format offered an opportunity for States to deepen their understanding of how others perceive actions and behaviours in the ICT environment as well as to listen to what others consider as the most significant threats and risks. 7. Some States expressed concern over the development or use of ICT capabilities for purposes that are inconsistent with the objectives of maintaining international peace and security. Some voiced concern that the characteristics of the ICT environment may encourage unilateral measures rather than the settlement of disputes by peaceful means. Some States noted their concern regarding the development of ICT capabilities for military and other such purposes that can undermine international peace and security. Other States recognized the legitimate right of militaries to develop and use ICT capabilities notinged that the threat lies in a States' use of such capabilities contrary to their obligations under international law, as well as the agreed voluntary norms of responsible state behaviour. Concerns were also raised about stockpiling of vulnerabilities as well as a lack of transparency and defined processes for disclosing them, the exploitation of harmful hidden functions, the integrity of global ICT supply chains and ensuring data security. Concerns were raised by some States that ICTs could be used to interfere in their internal affairs, including by means of information operations and disinformation campaigns. Pursuit of increasing automation and autonomy in ICT operations was put forward as a specific concern, as were actions that could lead to the reduction or disruption of connectivity, unintended escalation or effects that negatively impact third parties. Some States also noted the lack of clarity regarding the responsibilities of the private sector as a concern in and of itself. 8. States emphasized that measures to promote responsible State behaviour should remain technology-neutral, underscoring that it is the misuse of technologies, not the technologies themselves, that is of concern. States recognized that even as technological advances and new 2