Annex [Australia has not provided specific comments on this Annex, but notes that proposals receiving consensus support were reflected in the substantive OEWG report; we look forward to further discussion on the remainder, as appropriate] Specific language proposals under agenda item “Rules, norms and principles” from written submissions by delegations Noting that in their written contributions, many delegations made reference to existing norms, the below only reflects additional language proposals. Armenia  The states will refrain from any action that might result in attempted disruption of the integrity of critical infrastructures and government activities, and offer through secure channels timely clarifications to prevent further possible escalation. Australia, Czech Republic, Estonia, Japan, Kazakhstan and United States of America Text providing guidance on implementation of 2015 norms ¶13(f) and (g)   In providing guidance for the implementation of these norms, States should note that highlighting particular sectors as critical infrastructure is not intended to be an exhaustive list and does not impact on the national designation, or not, of any other sector, nor does it implicitly condone malicious activity against a category not specified. The OEWG developed its report in the context of the COVID-19 pandemic. In these circumstances, the OEWG underscored that all states considered medical services and medical facilities to be critical infrastructure for the purposes of norms (f) and (g). Belarus  States should reaffirm their commitments to the principle of abandonment of militarization of existing ICTs and the creation of new ICTs specifically designed to harm information resources, infrastructure and critical facilities of other countries. Canada Proposed norms guidance text to include in para 41 While the 2015 GGE norms articulate what actions States should or should not take, States underscored the need for guidance on how to operationalize them, and offered the following guidance on these norms. In the understanding of the OEWG, both the norms and the guidance are without prejudice to, and do not alter or diminish in any way, State’s existing rights and obligations under international law. a. Consistent with the purposes of the United Nations, including to maintain international peace and security, States should cooperate in developing and applying measures to increase stability and security in the use of ICTs and to prevent ICT practices that are acknowledged to be harmful or that may pose threats to international peace and security; (2015 ¶13(a)). i. This norm is general in nature. The implementation of the entire range of norms, as well as the specific guidance provided below, will contribute to the further operationalisation of this norm States should take a collaborative approach to working with each other and with nongovernmental stakeholders, including industry, academia and civil society. ii. To do so, States should, as appropriate, and when possible: Adopt and implement comprehensive national cyber security strategies. Whenever possible, these should promote international cooperation on cybersecurity 10