energy, water, transportation and sanitation. Attacks Malicious cyber activities on CI and CII that undermine trust and confidence in political and electoral processes, public institutions, or that impact the financial system, are also a real and growing concern. Such infrastructure may be owned, managed or operated by the private sector, may be shared or networked with another State or operated across different States. As a result, inter-State or public-private cooperation may be necessary to protect its integrity, functioning and availability. 22. States also agreed that using conducting or knowingly supporting use of ICT activitys to disrupt, damage, or destroy intentionally damage, or otherwise impair the use and operation of CI that provides services to the public and CII poses a threat not only to security, but also to economic development and livelihoods, and ultimately the safety and wellbeing of individuals. 23. States agreed that a lack of awareness and adequate capacities to detect, defend against or respond to malicious ICT activities constitutes a challenge as all countries are increasingly reliant on digital technologies. As witnessed during the current global health emergency, existing vulnerabilities may be amplified in times of crisis. Commented [A4]: Amendments to reflect consensus language in 2015 GGE norm 13(f) 24. States agreed that threats may be experienced differently by States according to their levels of capacity, ICT security and resilience, infrastructure and development. Threats may also have a different impact on different groups and entities, including on youth, the elderly, women and men, on vulnerable populations, particular professions, small and medium-sized enterprises, and others. 25. In light of the increasingly concerning digital threat landscape, and recognizing that no State is sheltered from these threats, States agreed on the urgency of implementing and further developing cooperative measures to address such threats. It was affirmed that acting together and inclusively whenever feasible would produce more effective and far-reaching results. The value of further strengthening collaboration, when appropriate, with civil society, the private sector, academia and the technical community, was also emphasized in this regard. C. International Law 26. Guided by the Group’s mandate, with a view to promoting common understandings of how international law applies to the use of ICTs by States, States had an exchange of views on how international law (general principles of law, treaties and customary international law) applies to the international security dimension of ICTs. Discussions 27. In their discussions at the OEWG, States recalled that international law, and in particular the Charter of the United Nations in its entirety, is applicable and essential to maintaining peace and stability and promoting an open, secure, stable, accessible and peaceful ICT environment. At the same time, States highlighted that further understanding was required on how some areas of international law applies apply to States’ use of ICTs. [Para could be moved to conclusion section, note duplication with para 37] 28. Specific principles of the UN Charter highlighted in the discussion include among others State sovereignty; sovereign equality; the settlement of international disputes by peaceful means in such a manner that international peace and security and justice are not endangered; refraining 5 Commented [A5]: At the virtual meeting 18-19 February, several delegations suggested deleting the Discussions sections of the zero draft (to shorten and focus efforts in the final hybrid negotiations). Australia sees value in retaining the Discussions sections (and has provided in text comments on each discussion section accordingly). That said, Australia is willing to adopt a pragmatic and flexible approach to conclude a consensus report in the context of the ongoing COVID-19 pandemic. If it is decided to delete the discussions sections, the HIGHLIGHTED paragraphs from the Discussions section should be transferred to the conclusion section. Note: in determining the highlighted sections, we prioritised issues of importance to Australia, as well as issues that have been flagged as high priority by other delegations (including NAM). Likewise, we have focused on paragraphs that avoid repetition and duplication of preexisting recommendations, and which Australia believes – with negotiation – could receive consensus support.