27 b. Deterrence through continuous offensive efforts (Operation Between Wars). This effort is mainly covert and is combined with a PR effort. c. Civilian support operations. d. Ensuring legitimacy during routine, emergency and war to enable use of force, while providing IDF forces with freedom of action and denying the enemy of the same. Deterrence 25. Deterrence is perceptual, based on physical elements constituting enemy's considerations, such as: the results of previous conflicts, routine actions emphasizing the futility of conflict, and the constant threat by the IDF to use force. 26. The general and basic deterrence of the State of Israel – which depends on the IDF's strength and advantage – still exists. Its relevance, however, is limited compared to the past, due to the changed threat. 27. Deterrence must be specific and adapted to each enemy; it must be based on an ongoing analysis of the enemy's characteristics, considerations, capabilities, identity and decision-making processes. 28. Deterrence against any enemy must be – a. Without any specific context – general and cumulative over time, to sustain the current situation and set-up "rules of the game”, advantageous to Israel. b. Specific and focused in the event of a specific crisis context, to force the enemy to act, or avoid acting, to thwart deterioration and prevent war. c. The following are the components of deterrence: 1) A credible threat of fierce offensive action that will result in a heavy toll in the event of an attack on Israel. This component is based on – a) Force Buildup, part of which is visible to the enemy, demonstrating the willingness and capabilities of the IDF to harm it. b) Perceptual actions asserting willingness to accept risks. c) Limited offensive actions to signal deviations from the "rules of the game" and the readiness to take risks.