Section III HIPCAR – Cybercrime/e-Crimes Section 20 (2) enables investigating authorities to extend their search, or obtain similar access to another computer system or part of it, if certain conditions are fulfilled. The drafters decided that such authorisation is necessary as remote storage systems are currently being used with growing frequency. With regard to the limitation of the procedural instruments to national investigations, the provision is not applicable if the relevant information are stored on a computer system outside the territory (even if it can technically be accessed). The provision does not prescribe how an extension of a search shall be undertaken as the determination of this aspect is left to domestic law. Section 20(3) authorizes the competent authorities to seize or secure digital evidence. The term seize is defined in Section3. In addition to traditional approaches such as seizure of computer hardware (including computer-data storage media) the provision enables investigation authorities to carry out sophisticated and more minimalistic investigations such as the production of a copy of the relevant data. As such measures could lead to the production of multiple copies, additional measures are required. Consequently the competent authorities may include the ability to remove data at its original source and maintain the integrity of the data to ensure that it is not modified during the investigation process. Section 21: Assistance The identification of relevant digital evidence is accompanied by unique challenges. This is especially relevant for the identification of physical storage space given the quantity of data that can be processed and stored as well as the possible security measures that were implemented. Assistance from persons with specific knowledge (such as system administrators) about the functioning of a computer system can therefore be indispensible to an investigation. Such cooperation is not only a benefit to the investigating authorities but also to businesses, as without such assistance investigation authorities may be constrained to remain on the searched premises and prevent access to the computer system for long periods of time while undertaking investigations. Such extended duration of an investigation could create an economic burden on legitimate businesses. The drafters therefore decided to create an obligation of such relevant persons possessing knowledge of the functioning of a computer system or measures applied to protect computer data therein. Such assistance is however limited to that which is reasonably required. Section 21 sets out five (5) areas of assistance. However, the drafters found it important to highlight that the rule against self-incrimination hinders the application of the provision in relation to the suspect of the crime. Section 22: Production Order Competent authorities have various powerful processes and procedures in which to collect relevant electronic evidence. One of the most powerful processes is the search and seizure of computer data. This may prove to be of particular significance when conducting a search for evidence stored on servers of a hosting provider such procedures can interfere with the operation of the business, (even if the provider is assisting law enforcement in identifying the physical location). It is in light of this that the drafters decided to include an process in Section 22 (a) that compels a person in its territory to provide specified stored computer data. This provision shall not be interpreted as data retention obligation. The application of the provision is not limited to certain categories of data and is applicable with regard to content and traffic data. With regard to the specific regulation of subscriber information in Section 22(b), this category of data is not included in Section 22(a). In order to prevent an abuse of the process the drafters limited requests to those where information is reasonable required. In addition to this criterion, an order by a competent authority (magistrate/judge) is required. In those cases where investigators are trying to identify a suspect they may not focus on data being generated during electronic communication but rather on subscriber information that enables them to link criminal conduct to a person. The drafters decided to address this issue in a specific subparagraph (Section 22(b)). Section 22(b) is applicable with regard to any personal information about a subscriber or a 42 > Model Policy Guidelines & Legislative Text