Section III HIPCAR – Cybercrime/e-Crimes Part 4 introduces new investigation instruments (such as Section 27) and also aims to adapt traditional procedural measures (such as Section 20). All instruments referred to aims at permitting the obtaining and/or collection of data for the purpose of conducting specific criminal investigations or proceedings. The instruments described in Part 4 shall not only be used in traditional computer crime investigation but in any investigation that involves computer data and computer systems. The drafters discussed at great length the importance of safeguards. There was consensus that the application of procedural instruments provided in Sections 20-27 are to be subject to the conditions and safeguards. The drafters discussed the option of whether to include a comprehensive set of safeguards or whether make use of existing safeguards in the national law. As this legislative text is not directly applicable but only provides guidance for the adjustment and harmonisation of national laws and taking into consideration the differences that may exist in the national laws of each Caribbean country the drafters decided not to define safeguards but leave it to the national implementation process to ensure that all conditions or safeguards, which may be provided constitutionally, legislatively, judicially or otherwise, are applicable with regard to the instruments in Part 4. As new instruments might be established during the implementation process, an extension of existing safeguards may be necessary to balance the requirements of law enforcement with the protection of human rights and liberties. The differences within the legal systems in the Caribbean were not only taken into consideration with regard to safeguards but also with regard to the definition of conditions for the application of instruments. The provisions provide options for adjustment with regard to the authority in charge of ordering the application of an instrument (for example judge, magistrate, law enforcement, police), the basis of action (for example information on oath or affidavit), the level of certainly (for example suspect or believe) as well as the need to respond (for example may or shall). Finally the drafters decided to enable countries to defer from the implementation certain procedures. Having regard to differing standards relating to the ability to intercept communication, the ability to restrict procedural instruments was specifically provided for in this context. All instruments listed in Sections 20-27 do only apply to investigations within the territory of the investigating state. With regard to the transnational dimension of Cybercrime the drafters discussed the need to add a separate set of provisions that specifically with international cooperation in transnational Cybercrime investigation. However, the drafters decided that as a result of the specific mandate of the working group, the regulation on international cooperation should not be included Section 20: Search and Seizure Even in high-tech crime, investigation search and seizure remains an important investigation process. In general, the prevailing domestic criminal procedural laws include powers of search and seize with regard to tangible objects. But as some jurisdictions do not treat computer data as objects and only allow the seizure of tangible items this section aims at modernising domestic laws on search and seizure of stored computer data by establishing an equivalent power relating to stored data. The aim of Section 20 (1) is to facilitate the process of collecting digital evidence. The provision clarifies that a warrant is necessary to undertake any search operation. It applies to stored computer data. If such warrant is issued it authorises a law enforcement authorities to not only to activate a computer system, or in other form access it, but also to enter the suspect’s premises. The application of the process is not limited to cases where conclusive evidence of the commission of an offence can be collected, but is also applicable to such cases where computer data has been acquired by a person as a result of an offence. To ensure that the wording of the provision does not hinder the application of sophisticated investigation techniques, the drafters decided not to specify the techniques that may be used to search or access a computer system. The term “search includes” but is not limited to seeking, reading, inspecting or reviewing data. > Model Policy Guidelines & Legislative Text 41