private sector and academia. However, we are finding it difficult to see how this is reflected in the “pre-draft” report. Therefore, we suggest dedicating more space to the specific recommendations from the multistakeholder session. Moreover, we would support annexing the informal conclusions prepared by the Chair of the informal multistakeholder session, Mr. David Koh, of Singapore. B. Existing and Potential Threats 5. Generally, we recommend caution with the use of the phrase “states” due to the unspecific nature of the phrase. However, in section B15 we strongly recommend a rephrasing, since it gives room for the impression that “militarization of cyberspace” was a concern for the majority of Member States. In our view, the dominant concern was the steep increase in the use of ICT technology for malicious concerns for election purposes interference, and not militarization cyber-attacks and in itself. We noted among others cyber-enabled theft of intellectual property by certain states and non-state actors. As such, the OEWG report should more closely reflect what was said by several delegations {including Denmark). Military application of ICTs is a reality. Many UN Member States, including all of the PS, have developed or are developing ICT-capabilities for military purposes. However, this is not a concern as such. What is of concern is that some state actors are using these capabilities in violation of the three pillars of the Charter of the United Nation. Consequently, the OEWG should promote transparency in the development of military ICT-capabilities and states should openly admit to having them at their disposal. Moreover, the technology in itself is often of dual-use, and will continue to develop rapidly. As a result, we should apply a technology neutral approach in the course of our work. This point is emphasized reports, and therefore should be further highlighted in OEWG report. in the GGE In these perilous times during the COVID-19 crisis, we have witnessed even a global pandemic being used for malicious ICT activities. As a result, we encourage the Chair to give room for a section in the OEWG report expressing concern for the potential increase in malicious ICT activity by state and non-state actors during global catastrophes. C. International Law 8. Denmark supports continuing efforts to promote the application of international law to cyber space including efforts towards clarifying how existing international law applies in cyber space. We share the view that international law is the foundation for stability and predictability in international relations. Specifically we believe that international humanitarian law reduces risks and potential harm to both civilians and combatants in the context of armed conflict, while neither encouraging militarization nor legitimizing conflict.