  (h) States should respond to appropriate requests for assistance by another State whose critical infrastructure is subject to malicious ICT acts. States should also respond to appropriate requests to mitigate malicious ICT activity aimed at the critical infrastructure of another State emanating from their territory, taking into account due regard for sovereignty; (i) States should take reasonable steps to ensure the integrity of the supply chain so that end users can have confidence in the security of ICT products. States should seek to prevent the proliferation of malicious ICT tools and techniques and the use of harmful hidden functions; Strategies to Mitigate Cyber Security Incidents, to help organisations mitigate cyber security incidents caused by various cyber threats. The most effective of these mitigation strategies are known as the Essential Eight, which provides organisations with a baseline to improve their cyber security resilience. ASD’s Stay Smart Online initiative provides advice to all Australians on how home internet users and small businesses can protect themselves from, and reduce the risk of, cyber security threats. Upon receipt of an appropriate request for assistance, Australia will:    acknowledge receipt of the request; determine, in a timely fashion, whether we have the capacity and resources to provide the assistance requested; if we are able to assist, we will indicate the nature, scope and terms of the assistance that might be provided. The ACSC has published Cyber Supply Chain Risk Management Guidance. The Telecommunications and Other Legislation Amendment (Assistance and Access) Act 2018 (the Act) introduced key reforms to enhance industry cooperation with law enforcement and security agencies and improve agencies’ electronic surveillance powers. The measures enhance the existing ability of Australian agencies to undertake targeted, proportionate and independently oversighted surveillance activities. The Act expressly prohibits introduction of systemic weaknesses, or so-called 'backdoors'. Section 317B defines a systemic weakness/vulnerability as ‘a weakness/vulnerability’ that affects a whole class of technology…’. Further, Sections 317ZG and 317ZGA specify that providers cannot be required to build an interception, data retention or decryption capability (or build anything that removes a form of electronic protection, like encryption). Warrants are required to undertake surveillance or interception. The measures are subject to extensive oversight and independent review mechanisms. The Act equips agencies with the tools they need to effectively operate in the digital era and keep the Australian community safe - it is world leading in that it also contains extensive safeguards and protections that ensure the integrity of the supply chain so users can have confidence in ICT products. Any imposition of compulsory assistance obligations is subject to mandatory consultation with the affected communications provider. www.dfat.gov.au/cyberaffairs esafety.gov.au/parents

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