OP 26 (c) OP 26 (d) OP 26 (e) OP 26 (f) OP 16 (a) OP 16 (b) OP 16 (c) OP 16 (d) OP 16 (d)(i) Enhanced sharing of information among States on ICT security incidents, involving the more effective use of existing channels or the development of appropriate new channels and mechanisms to receive, collect, analyse and share information related to ICT incidents, for timely response, recovery and mitigation actions. States should consider exchanging information on national points of contact, in order to expand and improve existing channels of communication for crisis management, and supporting the development of early warning mechanisms; Exchanges of information and communication between national Computer Emergency Response Teams (CERTs) bilaterally, within CERT communities, and in other forums, to support dialogue at political and policy levels; Increased cooperation to address incidents that could affect ICT or critical infrastructure that rely upon ICT-enabled industrial control systems. This could include guidelines and best practices among States against disruptions perpetrated by non-State actors; Enhanced mechanisms for law enforcement cooperation to reduce incidents that could otherwise be misinterpreted as hostile State actions would improve international security. 2015 GGE Report (A/70/174) The identification of appropriate points of contact at the policy and technical levels to address serious ICT incidents and the creation of a directory of such contacts; The development of and support for mechanisms and processes for bilateral, regional, subregional and multilateral consultations, as appropriate, to enhance inter-State confidence-building and to reduce the risk of misperception, escalation and conflict that may stem from ICT incidents; Encouraging, on a voluntary basis, transparency at the bilateral, subregional, regional and multilateral levels, as appropriate, to increase confidence and inform future work. This could include the voluntary sharing of national views and information on various aspects of national and transnational threats to and in the use of ICTs; vulnerabilities and identified harmful hidden functions in ICT products; best practices for ICT security; confidence-building measures developed in regional and multilateral forums; and national organizations, strategies, policies and programmes relevant to ICT security; The voluntary provision by States of their national views of categories of infrastructure that they consider critical and national efforts to protect them, including information on national laws and policies for the protection of data and ICT-enabled infrastructure. States should seek to facilitate cross-border cooperation to address critical infrastructure vulnerabilities that transcend national borders. These measures could include: A repository of national laws and policies for the protection of data and ICT-enabled infrastructure and the publication of materials deemed appropriate for distribution on these national laws and policies; www.dfat.gov.au/cyberaffairs esafety.gov.au/parents