The need for cyber and electromagnetic activities 1.3. There is also the challenge of achieving interoperability and sustaining knowledge parity while conducting joint and coalition operations. While many of these challenges will also be faced by our adversaries, low entry costs and the rapid adoption of cutting edge technology means they may be equally, or better, placed to use information as a force multiplier. However, our challenge is to operate within the constraints of UK and Allied, policy, doctrine and law, whilst our adversaries have no need to and indeed gain an edge in not doing so. 1 1.4. Russian operations in south-eastern and eastern Europe highlighted the effectiveness of synchronising CEMA with conventional operational activities to shape both the adversary’s and international perception. 2 However, within the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) and specifically UK doctrine, force and capability development have not kept pace. Joint Concept Note (JCN) 1/17, Future Force Concept identified the need for CEMA while this joint doctrine note (JDN) provides clarification by exploring how the CEMA concept is implemented so it can be undertaken with decisive advantage. 1.5. There are areas where cyber activities and electromagnetic activities overlap and these need to be defined. The nature of CEMA is such that it should be coordinated and may be synchronised across any, or all, activities. To deliver operational advantage, a deployable headquarters will need to synchronise as well as coordinate electronic warfare, spectrum management, signals intelligence3 and cyber operational activities with CEMA-enabling activities and other non-CEMA operational activity. The list below indicates some of the areas to be considered by a CEMA synchronisation and coordinating authority. This list is not exhaustive and issues of mission assurance should be considered. 2 This joint doctrine note (JDN) will look at Russian use of both cyber activities and electromagnetic activities and how they have developed, drawing parallels with UK CEMA aspirations and developments. Chapter 1 looks at the problems Russia encountered during operations in Georgia. Chapter 3 points to the successes on operations in Ukraine, while Chapter 4 looks at how the Russian military has evolved and focused on coordinated and synchronised actions to achieve the commander’s intent. 3 Signals intelligence incorporates electronic intelligence and communications intelligence. 4 JDN 1/18