A/75/123 the weapon be taken into consideration, in addition to whether those effects are direct (such as damage to the targeted system or interruption of service) or indirect (such as effects on the infrastructure controlled by the system under attack, and on persons affected by the malfunctioning or destruction of systems or the alteration and corruption of data), provided that those effects have a sufficient causal link with the attack. In accordance with this principle, the use of cyberweapons that cannot be controlled in time and space is also prohibited. This information is provided in the report on international law applied to operations in cyberspace, published by the Ministry of the Armed Forces on 9 September 2019, as well as in the public elements of French military doctrine on offensive cyberwarfare, published in the same year. France considers that a shared understanding is essential at the international level regarding the obligations of States whose infrastructure is suspected of being used maliciously against the interests of another State. The aim here is to clarify the application of the principle of due diligence, which provides that every State has an obligation “not to allow knowingly its territory to be used for acts contrary to the rights of other States”, to the online domain. 4 Accordingly, States should not knowingly allow their territory to be used for acts that are committed by electronic means and proscribed by international law, and must take all measures that can reasonably be expected of them to ensure that their territory is not used by non-State actors to commit such acts. France has identified the regulation of private actors’ capability to respond to incidents as an important area of work, which could help to ensure that the principle of due diligence is respected by limiting actions that adversely affect third parties. 5 A better understanding of how the principle applies to challenges in the area would strengthen cooperation among States with a view to protecting certain critical infrastructure and eliminating major cyberattacks made through third countries. Georgia [Original: English] [29 May 2020] The Government of Georgia, while promoting safe, resilient, secure and reliable eGovernment solutions and developing the information so ciety at large, closely considers every opportunity to address the recommendations of the Group of Governmental Experts on Developments in the Field of Information and Telecommunications in the Context of International Security on advancing responsible State behaviour in cyberspace. Georgia aspires to actively contribute to the principles and guidelines provided by the Open-ended Working Group on Developments in the Field of Information and Telecommunications in the Context of International Security and to develop dedicated national mechanisms for that purpose. This document summarizes important updates on cybersecurity and information security development in Georgia and efforts taken at the national level to strengthen information security and promote international cooperation. Georgia continues to be committed to developing its cybersecurity posture and making its cybersecurity profile comparatively advanced in the international arena. Georgia’s geopolitical conditions clearly raise the stakes for its c ybersecurity __________________ 4 5 20-08285 Corfu Channel case, Judgment of 9 April 1949, I.C.J. Reports 1949, p. 4. Such regulation, whose underlying principle should inform the work of the Group of Governmental Experts, should be based on a risk analysis related to the measures that can be taken by private actors on their own account in response to an incident. 39/84