attributable conduct to qualify as a wrongful intervention, the conduct must (1) interfere with the domaine réservé of a foreign State and (2) involve coercion.21 Especially the definition of the latter element requires further clarification in the cyber context. In its Nicaragua judgement, the International Court of Justice (ICJ) held that ‘[t]he element of coercion, which defines, and indeed forms the very essence of, prohibited intervention, is particularly obvious in the case of an intervention which uses force, either in the direct form of military action, or in the indirect form of support for subversive or terrorist armed activities within another State.’22 Malicious cyber activities will only in some cases amount to direct or indirect use of force.23 However, measures below this threshold may also qualify as coercive. Generally, Germany is of the opinion that cyber measures may constitute a prohibited intervention under international law if they are comparable in scale and effect to coercion in non-cyber contexts. Coercion implies that a State’s internal processes regarding aspects pertaining to its domaine réservé are significantly influenced or thwarted and that its will is manifestly bent by the foreign State’s conduct. However, as is widely accepted, the element of coercion must not be assumed prematurely. Even harsher forms of communication such as pointed commentary and sharp criticism as well as (persistent) attempts to obtain, through discussion, a certain reaction or the performance of a certain measure from another State do not as such qualify as coercion. Moreover, the acting State must intend to intervene in the internal affairs of the target State24 – otherwise the scope of the non-intervention principle would be unduly broad. In the context of wrongful intervention, the problem of foreign electoral interference by means of malicious cyber activities has become particularly virulent. Germany generally agrees with the opinion that malicious cyber activities targeting foreign elections may – either individually or as part of a wider campaign involving cyber and non-cyber-related tactics – constitute a wrongful intervention.25 For example, it is conceivable that a State, by spreading disinformation via the internet, may deliberately incite violent political upheaval, riots and/or civil strife in a foreign country, thereby significantly impeding the orderly conduct of an election and the casting of ballots. Such activities may be comparable in scale and effect to the support of insurgents and may hence be akin to coercion in the above-mentioned sense. A detailed assessment of the individual case would be necessary. Also, the disabling of election infrastructure and technology such as electronic ballots, etc. by malicious cyber activities may constitute a prohibited intervention, in particular if this compromises or even prevents the holding of an election, or if the results of an election are thereby substantially modified. 21 22 23 24 25 International Court of Justice (ICJ), Military and Paramilitary Activities in und against Nicaragua (Nicaragua v. United States of America), Merits, Judgement of 27 June 1986, I.C.J. Reports 1986, 14, para. 205. Ibid. See below, at II.c). Cf. Tallinn Manual 2.0 (note 4), rule 66, commentary, para. 27. See also above, II.a). 5