The world in 2028 – what do we have to prepare for? 2 Nothing is more constant than change. 2.1.1. Geopolitics and nationalism Predicting the world of 2028 is difficult. Nevertheless, various drivers of change point to a number of trends that provide a strategic framework to discuss Switzerland’s future foreign policy. Competition between the major powers will increasingly shape international relations – in strategic, economic and technological terms. Geopolitical tensions are growing. Interests are increasingly being asserted through the exertion of power. Nationalism and protectionism are resurgent. 2.1. Political drivers: Switzerland in a fragmented world shaped by power politics Globalisation remains a megatrend. The world will continue to be interconnected across a broad range of domains. But the pace of integration will not be as rapid as it was before the 2008 financial crisis. Something of a counter-trend is also evident: a return to national and local concerns. The international realignment of economic power is coupled with the fragmentation of global politics. Outside the Western world, liberal values are not as a matter of course associated with prosperity. A counter-narrative is gaining traction: capitalism without political pluralism. Competition between different systems of government and development models is challenging a global order that has historically been shaped by Western values. China China is is catching catchingup up––also alsoininscience science Percentage of articles cited in western scientific journals 50% 40% 30% 20% USA China 10% UK Germany Switzerland 3 The world in 2028 – what do we have to prepare for? 2017 2016 2014 Source: SCImago; https://www.scimagojr.com/countryrank.php 2015 2013 2011 2012 2010 2009 2007 2008 2006 2004 2005 2003 2001 2002 1999 2000 1997 1998 1996 0 The United States will remain the leading global power for the time being. While the United States makes up just 4% of the world’s population, it accounts for a quarter of global value added, 35% of global innovation and 40% of global arms expenditures. Yet the United States’ self-perception of being the keeper of the global order is beginning to ebb. National interests are defined more narrowly than in the past. The United States’ transition from ‘leader of the free world’ to ‘America first’ began before the Trump administration and is likely to continue after his presidency. China has regained the status of a world power. China’s one-party state has set the pace for formidable economic growth and is systematically transforming China into a technological and scientific superpower. State capitalism combines with nationalist rhetoric that is once again increasingly based on Marxist-Leninist principles. China’s long-expected gradual adoption of the western developmental model has not taken place. Domestically, China faces major challenges. Internationally, China is the only major power with a clearly discernible foreign policy vision for the future. The Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) is a longterm global infrastructure and investment project. It aims to supply China with resources and energy. It also allows China to export its industrial overcapacities. The BRI aims to stimulate the development of China’s poorer western provinces and expand Beijing’s influence across Central Asia. It also seeks to open up transport routes to Europe, bypassing the maritime routes controlled by the United States. Many observers believe that Beijing also aims to use the BRI to realign world trade and policymaking, with China at the centre. The future will tell how successful China will be in implementing this centennial project – and with what consequences for the countries involved. The project’s vast scope is itself indicative of China’s new ambitions.