Czech Republic Position paper on the application of international law in cyberspace the effects of the particular act.22 If a cyber operation was comparable in its scale and effect to an attack by conventional means (kinetic operations) in terms of its gravity, such as fatalities, damage and destruction, it could be considered as constituting an armed attack under Article 51 of the UN Charter. 30. The Czech Republic reiterates the provisions of the UN Charter and customary international law that if an armed attack occurs, the affected State may exercise its inherent right to individual or collective self-defence under Article 51 of the UN Charter. The exercise of the right to self-defence shall meet the conditions of necessity and proportionality,23 but is not limited to cyber means and cyber domain, even if the armed attack was so conducted. Collective self-defence against a cyber operation amounting to an armed attack can be exercised only at the request of the victim State and within the scope of such a request.24 Law of Neutrality 31. The purpose of the law of neutrality is to spare neutral States25 and their inhabitants from the effects of hostilities, and to prevent an escalation of an international armed conflict. 32. Due to worldwide interconnectivity of cyberspace, the law of neutrality is of great importance for cyber operations conducted as part of an international armed conflict. The Czech Republic shares the position taken by the Tallinn Manual 2.0 that the law of neutrality applies to cyber operations and cyber infrastructure.26 33. Cyber infrastructure located within the territory of a neutral State or under its exclusive control is protected by the State’s territorial integrity and international humanitarian law. As long as such infrastructure is not used by the parties to the international armed conflict for the exercise of their belligerent rights, it is considered neutral in character irrespective of public or private ownership or the nationality of the owners. As such, it is protected from any harmful interference by the parties to the international armed conflict. 22 See para 195 of the Military and Paramilitary Activities in and against Nicaragua (Nicaragua v. United States of America), Merits, Judgment of 27 June 1986, ICJ Reports 1986. 23 See para 176 of the Military and Paramilitary Activities in and against Nicaragua (Nicaragua v. United States of America), Merits, Judgment of 27 June 1986, ICJ Reports 1986. 24 See para 195 of the Military and Paramilitary Activities in and against Nicaragua (Nicaragua v. United States of America), Merits, Judgment of 27 June 1986, ICJ Reports 1986. 25 For the purposes of this paper, the term “neutral State” refers to a State which is not a Party to an ongoing international armed conflict. See ICRC, Commentary on the Third Geneva Convention, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 2020 (forthcoming), para. 1082; San Remo Manual on International Law Applicable to Armed Conflicts at Sea (1994), para. 13(d); Manual on International Law Applicable to Air and Missile Warfare (2009), Rule 1(aa); Helsinki Principles on the Law of Maritime Neutrality (1998), Article 1.1; Tallinn Manual 2.0 (2017), Chapter 20, para. 2. 26 Chapter 20 chapeau of the Tallinn Manual 2.0 on the international law applicable to cyber operations, 2 nd edition, CUP, 2017. 9