JIHADIST AND ETHNO-NATIONALIST TERRORISM AND VIOLENT EXTREMISM | SITUATION of major cities. The bulk of these attacks were carried out by lone perpetrators operating with minimal logistical resources. Knives or vehicles were used in around three-quarters of the attacks, with the others involving explosives and (only rarely) firearms. Almost all the perpetrators had been inspired by ‘Islamic State’. However, no evidence was found of a direct link between ‘Islamic State’ and any of the perpetrators, even where they acted in line with its aims and in some cases verifiably in its name or where ‘Islamic State’ subsequently claimed responsibility for the act. The perpetrators were all male, Muslim and between 17 and 53 years of age (average age just under 30). Most of the perpetrators lived in the state concerned or even near the crime scene. Most came from a migrant background, but had been born in the state in which they carried out the attack and/or had acquired citizenship of that state. Approximately half the perpetrators had a North African background. Many of the perpetrators were previously unknown to the security authorities or had attracted their attention only due to involvement in petty crime. Radicalisation in Switzerland The phenomenon of radicalisation in relation to jihadist terrorism continues to be an issue for Switzerland. Despite ‘Islamic State’'s territorial losses and a discernible decline in the quality and quantity of the terrorist organisation's propaganda activities, individuals from a wide range of backgrounds continue to be drawn to the ideas of jihadist terrorism. The FIS has established through its monitoring of jihadist websites that the majority of the users in Swit- zerland who have come to its attention are still more likely to be ‘Islamic State’ sympathisers, though the proportion supporting al-Qaeda has once again increased. Alongside the consumption of jihadist content on the Internet, personal contacts still play a key role when it comes to radicalisation. Such contacts are also more and more often deliberately being arranged outside the confines of institutions such as mosques, for example. As elsewhere, there are a few radicalised individuals in Switzerland who devote themselves to recruitment. They try to win people they know over to Salafism and ultimately to jihad. Particularly in population centres close to borders, there are cross-border links which are also used for recruitment. To counter the recruitement activities of salafist networks, a number of measures have been evaluated and initiated. Measures on the communal and cantonal level to stop ‘Read’ distribution activities, such as the denial of legal permits, have been shown to be the most effective means. Since the authorities began to implement these measures in a more consistent way in the early summer of 2017, a significant reduction of ‘Read!’ Quran distribution activi­ ties has been observed. Sporadic attempts of ‘Read!’ activists to continue with related activities such as ‘Free Quran’ or ‘We love Mohammed’, have also been stopped. Security authorities are also increasingly focussing their attention on recruitement activities in prisons. Outside Switzerland, a number of attacks have recently been carried out by individuals who had either been radicalised whilst in prison or had radicalised other pris- SIT UAT ION R E PORT 2 0 1 8 | FIS 39