In the context of military missions and operations, cyber defence actors are dealing with information of different formats, classifications, coming from different sources. This makes the application of secure state-of-the-art technology, such as AI, with the support of industry of utmost importance. The security of CIS infrastructure needs to be improved by applying mutually agreed management procedures, thus fostering trust in the integrity of information available among stakeholders. In addition, the High Representative including in the capacity as Head of EDA, with the support of the Commission, will assist Member States with the development of nonlegally binding recommendations for the defence community, inspired by the Directive on measures for a high common level of cybersecurity across the Union (NIS2)24, as defence is excluded from the scope of the Directive. This will contribute to an increased overall cyber defence maturity. The Commission proposal for a Cyber Resilience Act25, which aims to lay down cybersecurity requirements for products with digital elements, will also further reduce the attack surface in dual-use products used for instance in CIS by the defence industry and government defence actors. According to the proposal, manufacturers would be required to report actively exploited vulnerabilities within 24 hours to ENISA, which will inform the relevant national CSIRTs. In this regard it would also be important to ensure that the defence community is swiftly informed about vulnerabilities in products with digital elements, as well as of any available and/ or applied patches and mitigating measures. All the more so in the light of the dependence of the military on civilian critical infrastructure, there is also a need to further increase the protection of critical infrastructure against large-scale cyberattacks. At the request of the Council26, the Commission, the High Representative and the NIS Cooperation Group27, are developing risk scenarios for digital infrastructure security. The focus will in the first instance be on cybersecurity in the energy, telecoms and transport sectors, and space. In addition to this, targeted cybersecurity risk assessments for communications infrastructure and networks in the EU (including fixed and mobile infrastructure, satellite, undersea cables, and internet routing) will also be prepared 28. Regarding the protection of critical infrastructure against man-made threats, including hybrid threats, the proposal for a Council Recommendation on a coordinated approach by the Union to strengthen the resilience of critical infrastructure29 calls on Member States to ensure appropriate stress testing and crisis coordination, among other things. The maritime critical infrastructure, including the protection of undersea data cables, will be further addressed through the forthcoming revision of the EU Maritime Security Strategy and its Action Plan. 24 Directive on measures for a high common level of cybersecurity across the Union, repealing Directive (EU) 2016/1148 that has been recently agreed by co-legislators and is expected to be formally adopted by the end of this year. 25 Proposal for a Regulation on horizontal cybersecurity requirements for products with digital elements and amending Regulation (EU) 2019/1020, COM/2022/454 final 26 Council conclusions on the development of the European Union's cyber Posture; ST09364/22, 23 May 2022 27 https://digital-strategy.ec.europa.eu/en/policies/nis-cooperation-group 28 Nevers Call to Reinforce the EU’s Cybersecurity Capabilities 29 Proposal for a COUNCIL RECOMMENDATION on a coordinated approach by the Union to strengthen the resilience of critical infrastructure, COM/2022/551 final 9