A/76/187 In addition, the aggressor country is making efforts to constantly develop a network of controlled information resources. In particular, the occupation administrations in the temporarily occupied territories of our State are taking systematic measures aimed at creating new information platforms, increasing the number of television channels and expanding the coverage area of television and radio broadcasting, including in the territories controlled by the Ukrainian authorities. In addition to the distribution of anti-Ukrainian content, powerful retransmission equipment installed by the Russian occupation authorities is used to suppress the signal of domestic television and radio broadcasting by disseminating so -called “white noise” on the frequencies that are used by the Ukrainian side to convey objective information to the residents of temporarily occupied territories. This is especially relevant in terms of the coding by the largest media groups in the country (Inter Media Group, StarLightMedia, Media Group Ukraine, 1 + 1) of the satellite signal of their television channels and the unsatisfactory state of coverage of the territory of Ukraine by national television and radio broadcasting in digital standard. As a result, residents of border areas of Ukraine are under the constant influence of destructive content from the main propaganda channels of the Russian Federation. Another factor of negative influence, which complicates the delivery of positional content to the residents of the temporarily occupied territories of Ukraine, is the operation of operators and providers of the temporarily occupied territories, which limit the access of the local population to the Ukrainian segment of the Internet. Thus, in violation of European law, registration of IP addresses for the work of so -called Internet providers in Crimea and in occupied areas of Donbass is provided by the non-profit organization RIPE NCC (Netherlands). In order to bring the activities of this organization into line with the current legislation of Ukraine, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Ukraine and the Embassy of Ukraine in the Kingdom of the Netherlands are taking appropriate measures at the inter-State level. There are also cases of the Russian Federation using Apple and Google services to spread misinformation in order to manipulate users of the Ukrainian segment of the Internet. In particular, in the App Store and the Play Market, there are mobile applications developed by legal entities and persons in respect of wh om special economic and other restrictive measures (sanctions) have been applied in accordance with the Decision of the National Security and Defence Council of 14 May 2020 on the application, cancellation and amendment of personal special economic and oth er restrictive measures (sanctions), enacted by Decree No. 184/2020 of the President of Ukraine of 14 May 2020. These software products in their functionality have the technical ability to provide access to the web resources banned in Ukraine. Despite all the efforts of our State to strengthen information security and block the spread of misinformation, as one of the biggest threats in the information sphere, there is an urgent need to assist the world community and international institutions in adequately counteracting information aggression by the Russian Federation, not only against Ukraine, but also in relation to other countries, from the position of which it conducts actions of destructive influence in the information space. Until recently, the destructive informational influence of the Russian Federation, its attempts to interfere in the internal affairs of our State and its attempts to impose its conditions in the implementation of international cooperation and domestic processes were carried out through affiliated Ukrainian political parties and movements, direct covert funding of civic institutions and economic entities operating on the territory of our State, forceful pressure through military aggression in eastern Ukraine or blocking international support and Ukraine’s accession to the European Union and the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO), and conducting information campaigns, operations and actions through controlled information resources. 21-10045 31/46