A/76/136 strife in a foreign country, thereby significantly impeding the orderly conduct of an election and the casting of ballots. Such activities may be comparable in scale and effect to the support of insurgents and may hence be akin to coercion in the abovementioned sense. A detailed assessment of the individual case would be necessary. Also, the disabling of election infrastructure and technology such as electronic ballots, etc. by malicious cyber activities may constitute a prohibited intervention, in particular if this compromises or even prevents the holding of an election, or if the results of an election are thereby substantially modified. Furthermore, beyond the mentioned examples, cyber activities targeting elections may be comparable in scale and effect to coercion if they aim at and result in a substantive disturbance or even permanent change of the political system of the targeted State, i.e. by significantly eroding public trust in a State’s political organs and processes, by seriously impeding important State organs in the fulfilment of their functions or by dissuading significant groups of citizens from voting, thereby undermining the meaningfulness of an election. Due to the complexity and singularity of such scenarios, it is difficult to formulate abstract criteria. Discussions in this context are still ongoing. c) Prohibition of the use of force So far, the vast majority of malicious cyber operations fall outside the scope of ‘force’. However, cyber operations might in extremis fall within the scope of the prohibition of the use of force and thus constitute a breach of art. 2 para. 4 UN Charter. The ICJ has stated in its Nuclear Weapons opinion that Charter provisions ‘apply to any use of force, regardless of the weapons employed.’ 77 Germany shares the view that with regard to the definition of ‘use of force’, emphasis needs to be put on the effects rather than on the means used. Cyber operations can cross the threshold into use of force and cause significant damage in two ways. Firstly, they can be part of a wider kinetic attack. In such cases they are one component of a wider operation clearly involving the use of physical force, and can be assessed within the examination of the wider incident. Secondly, outside the wider context of a kinetic military operation, cyber operations can by themselves cause serious harm and may result in massive casualties. With regard to the latter case, Germany shares the view expressed in the Tallinn Manual 2.0: the threshold of use of force in cyber operations is defined, in analogy to the ICJ’s Nicaragua judgement, 78 by the scale and effects of such a cyber operation. 79 Whenever scale and effects of a cyber operation are comparable to those of a traditional kinetic use of force, it would constitute a breach of art. 2 para. 4 UN Charter. The determination of a cyber operation as having crossed the threshold of a prohibited use of force is a decision to be taken on a case-by-case basis. Based on the assessment of the scale and effects of the operation, the broader context of the situation and the significance of the malicious cyber operation will have to be taken into account. Qualitative criteria which may play a role in the assessment are, inter alia, the severity of the interference, the immediacy of its effects, the degree of __________________ 77 78 79 21-09670 International Court of Justice (ICJ), Legality of the Threat or Use of Nuclear Weapons, Advisory Opinion of 8 July 1996, I.C.J. Reports 1996, 226, para. 39. ICJ, Military and Paramilitary Activities in and against Nicaragua (note 72), para. 195. Tallinn Manual 2.0 (note 55), rules 69, 71. 35/142