13 with appropriate authorities across the world. The National Cyber Security Centre’s Incident Management team operates 24/7, and is the national point of contact for any requests for assistance. At the OSCE, the UK has supported efforts on Confidence Building Measure 8 on the creation of a list of national policy and technical points of contact. And in NATO, the NCSC has encouraged members of the Alliance to embrace their role as lead responders to global attacks from state and non-state actors. We also have set up a 24/7 point of contact within the National Crime Agency to exchange information with States to tackle all cybercrime related threats, in accordance with the Budapest Convention. Norm 9 (UNGGE 2015 report, paragraph 13i) – States should take reasonable steps to ensure the integrity of the supply chain, so end users can have confidence in the security of ICT products. States should seek to prevent the proliferation of malicious ICT tools and techniques and the use of harmful hidden functions; As risks, threats and technology change it is important that states are able to respond. That is why the United Kingdom has undertaken a thorough review of the 5G supply chain to ensure the secure and resilient rollout of 5G. The Telecoms Supply Chain Review introduced a tougher, strengthened new security regime for our telecoms infrastructure. Secure by Design: We are addressing this through implementation of our national strategy, and investment in our national programme. The NCSC has produced public advice and guidance aimed at all sections of the UK economy and society; this has helped improve awareness across the UK. The UK published a Code of Practice for Consumer IoT Security in October 2018. This outlines 13 high-level and outcome focused guidelines that manufacturers should embed into their products to make them ‘secure by design’ and to take the burden from consumers having to secure their own products. We have made this available for international partners. It has been translated into Japanese, Mandarin, German, Korean, French, Spanish and Portuguese. In the UK, we are preparing to place the priority guidelines of the Code of Practice on a regulatory footing. Alongside this, one area we are actively exploring is how to build an effective labelling scheme that will inform consumers and retailers of manufacturers’ cyber security standards, without overburdening consumers. We are supporting manufacturers of all sizes to implement the Code, which is why we published a mapping document to support implementation. A number of core manufacturers (including Centrica Hive and HP Inc.) have already made a formal pledge, and support from DCMS and NCSC is available to manufacturers and retailers who wish to make a public commitment to proactively protect their consumers in advance of expectations being mandatory.