(h) States should respond to
appropriate requests for
assistance by another State
whose critical infrastructure is
subject to malicious ICT acts.
States should also respond to
appropriate requests to
mitigate malicious ICT activity
aimed at the critical
infrastructure of another State
emanating from their
territory, taking into account
due regard for sovereignty;
(i) States should take
reasonable steps to ensure
the integrity of the supply
chain so that end users can
have confidence in the
security of ICT products.
States should seek to prevent
the proliferation of malicious
ICT tools and techniques and
the use of harmful hidden
functions;
Strategies to Mitigate Cyber Security Incidents, to help organisations
mitigate cyber security incidents caused by various cyber threats.
The most effective of these mitigation strategies are known as
the Essential Eight, which provides organisations with a baseline to
improve their cyber security resilience.
ASD’s Stay Smart Online initiative provides advice to all Australians
on how home internet users and small businesses can protect
themselves from, and reduce the risk of, cyber security threats.
Upon receipt of an appropriate request for assistance, Australia will:
acknowledge receipt of the request;
determine, in a timely fashion, whether we have the capacity and
resources to provide the assistance requested;
if we are able to assist, we will indicate the nature, scope and terms
of the assistance that might be provided.
The ACSC has published Cyber Supply Chain Risk Management Guidance.
The Telecommunications and Other Legislation Amendment (Assistance and
Access) Act 2018 (the Act) introduced key reforms to enhance industry
cooperation with law enforcement and security agencies and improve
agencies’ electronic surveillance powers. The measures enhance the existing
ability of Australian agencies to undertake targeted, proportionate and
independently oversighted surveillance activities. The Act expressly prohibits
introduction of systemic weaknesses, or so-called 'backdoors'. Section 317B
defines a systemic weakness/vulnerability as ‘a weakness/vulnerability’ that
affects a whole class of technology…’. Further, Sections 317ZG and 317ZGA
specify that providers cannot be required to build an interception, data
retention or decryption capability (or build anything that removes a form of
electronic protection, like encryption). Warrants are required to undertake
surveillance or interception. The measures are subject to extensive oversight
and independent review mechanisms. The Act equips agencies with the
tools they need to effectively operate in the digital era and keep the
Australian community safe - it is world leading in that it also contains
extensive safeguards and protections that ensure the integrity of the supply
chain so users can have confidence in ICT products. Any imposition of
compulsory assistance obligations is subject to mandatory consultation with
the affected communications provider.
www.dfat.gov.au/cyberaffairs
esafety.gov.au/parents
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